diff options
| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2025-07-29 16:34:45 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2025-07-29 16:34:45 -0700 |
| commit | 04d29e3609b62896b94b60250d475f8f7c15db98 (patch) | |
| tree | d618a2057a76256c57705fee31a929830f0e230e /include/linux | |
| parent | d7223aed30cd77be31dabd635e709828f3255366 (diff) | |
| parent | a026dc61cffd98541e048f3c88d3280bcd105bd4 (diff) | |
Merge tag 'x86_bugs_for_v6.17_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 CPU mitigation updates from Borislav Petkov:
- Untangle the Retbleed from the ITS mitigation on Intel. Allow for ITS
to enable stuffing independently from Retbleed, do some cleanups to
simplify and streamline the code
- Simplify SRSO and make mitigation types selection more versatile
depending on the Retbleed mitigation selection. Simplify code some
- Add the second part of the attack vector controls which provide a lot
friendlier user interface to the speculation mitigations than
selecting each one by one as it is now.
Instead, the selection of whole attack vectors which are relevant to
the system in use can be done and protection against only those
vectors is enabled, thus giving back some performance to the users
* tag 'x86_bugs_for_v6.17_rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (31 commits)
x86/bugs: Print enabled attack vectors
x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for TSA
x86/pti: Add attack vector controls for PTI
x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for ITS
x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for SRSO
x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for L1TF
x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2
x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for BHI
x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v2_user
x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for retbleed
x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for spectre_v1
x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for GDS
x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for SRBDS
x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for RFDS
x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for MMIO
x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for TAA
x86/bugs: Add attack vector controls for MDS
x86/bugs: Define attack vectors relevant for each bug
x86/Kconfig: Add arch attack vector support
cpu: Define attack vectors
...
Diffstat (limited to 'include/linux')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/linux/cpu.h | 21 |
1 files changed, 21 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/cpu.h b/include/linux/cpu.h index 6378370a952f..1fb143ee1ffa 100644 --- a/include/linux/cpu.h +++ b/include/linux/cpu.h @@ -198,9 +198,25 @@ void cpuhp_report_idle_dead(void); static inline void cpuhp_report_idle_dead(void) { } #endif /* #ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU */ +enum cpu_attack_vectors { + CPU_MITIGATE_USER_KERNEL, + CPU_MITIGATE_USER_USER, + CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_HOST, + CPU_MITIGATE_GUEST_GUEST, + NR_CPU_ATTACK_VECTORS, +}; + +enum smt_mitigations { + SMT_MITIGATIONS_OFF, + SMT_MITIGATIONS_AUTO, + SMT_MITIGATIONS_ON, +}; + #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_MITIGATIONS extern bool cpu_mitigations_off(void); extern bool cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt(void); +extern bool cpu_attack_vector_mitigated(enum cpu_attack_vectors v); +extern enum smt_mitigations smt_mitigations; #else static inline bool cpu_mitigations_off(void) { @@ -210,6 +226,11 @@ static inline bool cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt(void) { return false; } +static inline bool cpu_attack_vector_mitigated(enum cpu_attack_vectors v) +{ + return false; +} +#define smt_mitigations SMT_MITIGATIONS_OFF #endif #endif /* _LINUX_CPU_H_ */ |
