diff options
| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2026-11-21 17:11:11 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2026-11-21 17:11:11 -0800 |
| commit | eef2bc5a82c25d25c3082f5d86d97a300caeb678 (patch) | |
| tree | 5447c7107ee4e05eeaeb29bc4465ccecb5f222de /include/uapi/linux | |
| parent | f802b6558eb81bd5888d761a0cdc8afe5fd8c941 (diff) | |
| parent | 4feb6879b9ab42cacb905f27a44160b7f1f49d85 (diff) | |
Merge tag 'landlock-7.4-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux
Pull Landlock fixes from Mickaël Salaün:
- prevent composed rulesets from denying link and rename operations
that each ruleset allows separately;
- close capability-mediation gaps for low-address mappings, inheritable
capabilities, the admin memory reserve, and PR_SET_SECUREBITS, so LSM
capability denials apply consistently;
- distinguish namespace creation from entry in denial records and
expose the checked capability context to BPF tracepoint consumers, so
they can interpret denials correctly.
* tag 'landlock-7.4-rc4' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux:
landlock: Add missing EINVAL case in the doc for landlock_add_rule
clang-format: Fix formatting of guard()
landlock: Document namespace denial operations
selftests/landlock: Test namespace denial operations
landlock: Add capability objects to denial tracing
landlock: Distinguish namespace creation and entry denials
selftests/landlock: Test PR_SET_SECUREBITS mediation
capabilities: Check PR_SET_SECUREBITS with ns_capable()
landlock: Fix capability restriction documentation
selftests/landlock: Test capability checks outside the capable hook
landlock: Mediate CAP_SYS_ADMIN for the admin memory reserve
landlock: Mediate CAP_SETPCAP for inheritable capabilities
landlock: Mediate CAP_SYS_RAWIO for mappings below mmap_min_addr
landlock: Factor out capability denial checks
landlock: Clarify implicit handling of LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER
landlock: Simplify landlock_get_fs_access_mask()
selftests/landlock: Test that layering does not break refer
landlock: Add KUnit test for landlock_get_fs_access_mask()
landlock: Fix layer composition of LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER
Diffstat (limited to 'include/uapi/linux')
| -rw-r--r-- | include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 24 |
1 files changed, 12 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h index 24510e5d8479..8ce0406ba543 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h @@ -22,10 +22,10 @@ * enacted. Vice versa, access rights that are not specifically listed here are * not going to be denied by this ruleset when it is enacted. * - * For historical reasons, the %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER right is always denied - * by default, even when its bit is not set in @handled_access_fs. In order to - * add new rules with this access right, the bit must still be set explicitly - * (cf. `Filesystem flags`_). + * For historical reasons, as soon as any filesystem access right is handled in + * @handled_access_fs, the %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER right is always denied as + * well. In order to add new rules with this access right, the bit must still + * be set explicitly (cf. `Filesystem flags`_). * * The explicit listing of *handled access rights* is required for backwards * compatibility reasons. In most use cases, processes that use Landlock will @@ -462,10 +462,11 @@ struct landlock_capability_attr { * This access right is available since the second version of the Landlock * ABI. * - * This is the only access right which is denied by default by any ruleset, - * even if the right is not specified as handled at ruleset creation time. - * The only way to make a ruleset grant this right is to explicitly allow it - * for a specific directory by adding a matching rule to the ruleset. + * This is the only access right which is denied by default by any ruleset + * that handles filesystem access rights, even if the right is not specified + * as handled at ruleset creation time. The only way to make a ruleset grant + * this right is to explicitly allow it for a specific directory by adding a + * matching rule to the ruleset. * * In particular, when using the first Landlock ABI version, Landlock will * always deny attempts to reparent files between different directories. @@ -622,10 +623,9 @@ struct landlock_capability_attr { * - %LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_CAPABILITY_USE: Restrict the use of specific Linux * capabilities. A process in a Landlock domain that handles this permission * is denied from exercising capabilities that are not explicitly allowed by a - * %LANDLOCK_RULE_CAPABILITY rule. This hook is purely restrictive: it can - * deny capabilities that the kernel would otherwise grant, but it can never - * grant capabilities that the kernel already denied. Support added in - * Landlock ABI version 12. + * %LANDLOCK_RULE_CAPABILITY rule. Landlock only reduces the capabilities + * that processes can use: it does not let them use capabilities that they + * would not have without Landlock. Support added in Landlock ABI version 12. */ #define LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_NAMESPACE_USE (1ULL << 0) #define LANDLOCK_PERMISSION_CAPABILITY_USE (1ULL << 1) |
