diff options
| author | Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> | 2026-04-19 23:33:56 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> | 2026-05-07 16:10:00 +0800 |
| commit | 6f88f41eeb7d4ef34e4ddb133d10779a316da67f (patch) | |
| tree | e564b9febb83de778c6fd9ff2b0ba7f818017cd1 /include/video | |
| parent | f2e5cd7baea4f1d6fc9fe1a0472b9316eb29b396 (diff) | |
crypto: drbg - Remove support for CTR_DRBG
Remove the support for CTR_DRBG. It's likely unused code, seeing as
HMAC_DRBG is always enabled and prioritized over it unless
NETLINK_CRYPTO is used to change the algorithm priorities.
There's also no compelling reason to support more than one of
[HMAC_DRBG, HASH_DRBG, CTR_DRBG]. By definition, callers cannot tell
any difference in their outputs. And all are FIPS-certifiable, which is
the only point of the kernel's NIST DRBGs anyway.
Switching to CTR_DRBG doesn't seem all that compelling, either. While
it's often the fastest NIST DRBG, it has several disadvantages:
- CTR_DRBG uses AES. Some platforms don't have AES acceleration at all,
causing a fallback to the table-based AES code which is very slow and
can be vulnerable to cache-timing attacks. In contrast, HMAC_DRBG
uses primitives that are consistently constant-time.
- CTR_DRBG is usually considered to be somewhat less cryptographically
robust than HMAC_DRBG. Granted, HMAC_DRBG isn't all that great
either, e.g. given the negative result from Woodage & Shumow (2018)
(https://eprint.iacr.org/2018/349.pdf), but that can be worked around.
- CTR_DRBG is more complex than HMAC_DRBG, risking bugs. Indeed, while
reviewing the CTR_DRBG code, I found two bugs, including one where it
can return success while leaving the output buffer uninitialized.
- The kernel's implementation of CTR_DRBG uses an "ctr(aes)"
crypto_skcipher and relies on it returning the next counter value.
That's fragile, and indeed historically many "ctr(aes)"
crypto_skcipher implementations haven't done that. E.g. see
commit 511306b2d075 ("crypto: arm/aes-ce - update IV after partial final CTR block"),
commit fa5fd3afc7e6 ("crypto: arm64/aes-blk - update IV after partial final CTR block"),
commit 371731ec2179 ("crypto: atmel-aes - Fix saving of IV for CTR mode"),
commit 25baaf8e2c93 ("crypto: crypto4xx - fix ctr-aes missing output IV"),
commit 334d37c9e263 ("crypto: caam - update IV using HW support"),
commit 0a4491d3febe ("crypto: chelsio - count incomplete block in IV"),
commit e8e3c1ca57d4 ("crypto: s5p - update iv after AES-CBC op end").
I.e., there were many years where the kernel's CTR_DRBG code (if it
were to have actually been used) repeated outputs on some platforms.
AES-CTR also uses a 128-bit counter, which creates overflow edge cases
that are sometimes gotten wrong. E.g. see commit 009b30ac7444
("crypto: vmx - CTR: always increment IV as quadword").
So, while switching to CTR_DRBG for performance reasons isn't completely
out of the question (notably BoringSSL uses it), it would take quite a
bit more work to create a solid implementation of it in the kernel,
including a more solid implementation of AES-CTR itself (in lib/crypto/,
with a scalar bit-sliced fallback, etc). Since HMAC_DRBG has always
been the default NIST DRBG variant in the kernel and is in a better
state, let's just standardize on it for now.
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org> # m68k
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/video')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions
