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authorAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>2026-05-11 08:27:02 -0700
committerAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>2026-05-11 08:27:02 -0700
commitd25e65a8b89725e9745bfc3acd738cdec3818a07 (patch)
tree86901e8beb3332a409962bc63d24995d278673a1 /kernel
parent5d6919055dec134de3c40167a490f33c74c12581 (diff)
parent344a00712ce1bce8db72b0eadc1595dede31565a (diff)
Merge branch 'bpf-fix-call-offset-truncation-and-oob-read-in-bpf_patch_call_args'
Yazhou Tang says: ==================== bpf: Fix call offset truncation and OOB read in bpf_patch_call_args() From: Yazhou Tang <tangyazhou518@outlook.com> This patchset addresses a silent truncation bug in the BPF verifier that occurs when a bpf-to-bpf call involves a massive relative jump offset. Additionally, it fixes a pre-existing out-of-bounds (OOB) read issue in the interpreter fallback path. Because the BPF instruction set utilizes a 32-bit imm field for bpf-to-bpf calls, implicitly downcasting it to the 16-bit insn->off in bpf_patch_call_args() causes incorrect call targets or subprog ID resolution for large BPF programs. While fixing this by swapping the imm and off fields, it was discovered that the original code also had a load-time OOB read vulnerability when the stack depth exceeds MAX_BPF_STACK during JIT fallback. Patch 1/3 fixes the pre-existing OOB read in bpf_patch_call_args(). It changes the function to return an int and explicitly rejects the JIT fallback if the stack depth exceeds MAX_BPF_STACK, preventing a potential stack buffer overflow. Patch 2/3 fixes the s16 truncation bug. 1. Keep the original imm field unchanged and use the off field to store the interpreter function index. 2. Adjust the JMP_CALL_ARGS case in ___bpf_prog_run() accordingly. 3. Restore the legacy xlated dump layout in bpf_insn_prepare_dump(). Patch 3/3 introduces a selftest for this fix. --- Change log: v10: 1. Make the error log in patch 1/3 more clear. (Kuohai) 2. Drop bpftool and disasm_helpers.c changes, and instead restore the legacy xlated dump layout in bpf_insn_prepare_dump(). This avoids requiring bpftool compatibility handling. (Quentin and Alexei) v9: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260429171904.107244-1-tangyazhou@zju.edu.cn/ 1. Modify the selftest in patch 3/3: use __clobber_all in inline asm. (Sashiko AI reviewer) v8: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260429105608.92741-1-tangyazhou@zju.edu.cn/ 1. Update cfg_partition_funcs() in bpftool to use insn->imm for call target calculation. (Sashiko AI reviewer) 2. Modify the selftest in patch 3/3: add a large padding before the call instruction, preventing the kernel panic on kernel without the fix. (Sashiko AI reviewer) 3. Modify the selftest in patch 3/3: make it more clear. v7: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260421144504.823756-1-tangyazhou@zju.edu.cn/ 1. Rebase the patchset to the bpf-next tree to resolve the apply conflict. (Alexei) 2. Add Patch 1/3 to properly fix a pre-existing OOB read in bpf_patch_call_args(). (Sashiko AI reviewer) v6: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260412170334.716778-1-tangyazhou@zju.edu.cn/ 1. Use a different but clearer approach to resolve this issue: keeping the original imm field unchanged and using the off field to store the interpreter function index. (Kuohai) 2. Update the related dumper code and remove a previous workaround in the selftests disasm helpers, which is no longer needed after this fix. v5: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260326090133.221957-1-tangyazhou@zju.edu.cn/ 1. Some minor changes in commit messages. (AI Reviewer) v4: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260326063329.10031-1-tangyazhou@zju.edu.cn/ 1. Remove some redundant commit messages of patch 2/3. (Emil) 2. Change the number of instructions in padding_subprog() from 200,000 to 32,765, which is the minimum number of instructions required to trigger the verifier failure. (Emil) v3: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260323122254.98540-1-tangyazhou@zju.edu.cn/ 1. Resend to fix a typo in v2 and add "Fixes" tag. The rest of the changes are identical to v2. v2 (incorrect): https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260323081748.106603-1-tangyazhou@zju.edu.cn/ 1. Move the s16 boundary check from fixup_call_args() to bpf_patch_call_args(), and change the return type of bpf_patch_call_args() to int. (Emil) 2. Add Patch 3/3 to fix the incorrect subprog ID in dumped bpf_pseudo_call instructions, which is caused by the same truncation issue. (Puranjay) 3. Refine the new selftest for clarity and add detailed comments explaining the test design. (Emil) v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20260316190220.113417-1-tangyazhou@zju.edu.cn/ ==================== Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260506094714.419842-1-tangyazhou@zju.edu.cn Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/core.c27
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/fixups.c13
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/syscall.c26
3 files changed, 54 insertions, 12 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
index 8b018ff48875..6aa2a8b24030 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
@@ -1771,6 +1771,9 @@ static u32 abs_s32(s32 x)
return x >= 0 ? (u32)x : -(u32)x;
}
+static u64 (*interpreters_args[])(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5,
+ const struct bpf_insn *insn);
+
/**
* ___bpf_prog_run - run eBPF program on a given context
* @regs: is the array of MAX_BPF_EXT_REG eBPF pseudo-registers
@@ -2077,10 +2080,9 @@ select_insn:
CONT;
JMP_CALL_ARGS:
- BPF_R0 = (__bpf_call_base_args + insn->imm)(BPF_R1, BPF_R2,
- BPF_R3, BPF_R4,
- BPF_R5,
- insn + insn->off + 1);
+ BPF_R0 = interpreters_args[insn->off](BPF_R1, BPF_R2, BPF_R3,
+ BPF_R4, BPF_R5,
+ insn + insn->imm + 1);
CONT;
JMP_TAIL_CALL: {
@@ -2394,13 +2396,22 @@ EVAL4(PROG_NAME_LIST, 416, 448, 480, 512)
#undef PROG_NAME_LIST
#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
-void bpf_patch_call_args(struct bpf_insn *insn, u32 stack_depth)
+int bpf_patch_call_args(struct bpf_insn *insn, u32 stack_depth)
{
stack_depth = max_t(u32, stack_depth, 1);
- insn->off = (s16) insn->imm;
- insn->imm = interpreters_args[(round_up(stack_depth, 32) / 32) - 1] -
- __bpf_call_base_args;
+ /* Prevent out-of-bounds read to interpreters_args */
+ if (stack_depth > MAX_BPF_STACK)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ insn->off = (round_up(stack_depth, 32) / 32) - 1;
insn->code = BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL_ARGS;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+s32 bpf_call_args_imm(s16 idx)
+{
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(idx < 0 || idx >= ARRAY_SIZE(interpreters_args)))
+ return 0;
+ return BPF_CALL_IMM(interpreters_args[idx]);
}
#endif
#endif
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/fixups.c b/kernel/bpf/fixups.c
index fba9e8c00878..3692adf62558 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/fixups.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/fixups.c
@@ -1250,9 +1250,9 @@ static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
}
if (!bpf_pseudo_call(insn))
continue;
- insn->off = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm;
- subprog = bpf_find_subprog(env, i + insn->off + 1);
- insn->imm = subprog;
+ insn->imm = env->insn_aux_data[i].call_imm;
+ subprog = bpf_find_subprog(env, i + insn->imm + 1);
+ insn->off = subprog;
}
prog->jited = 1;
@@ -1416,7 +1416,12 @@ int bpf_fixup_call_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
depth = get_callee_stack_depth(env, insn, i);
if (depth < 0)
return depth;
- bpf_patch_call_args(insn, depth);
+ err = bpf_patch_call_args(insn, depth);
+ if (err) {
+ verbose(env, "stack depth %d exceeds interpreter stack depth limit\n",
+ depth);
+ return err;
+ }
}
err = 0;
#endif
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index a3c0214ca934..630d530782fe 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -4919,6 +4919,29 @@ out:
return map;
}
+static void prepare_dump_pseudo_call(struct bpf_insn *insn)
+{
+ s32 call_off = insn->imm;
+
+ /*
+ * BPF_CALL_ARGS only exists for interpreter fallback.
+ * 1. For interpreter (BPF_CALL_ARGS): insn->off is the index of
+ * interpreters_args array, so here using bpf_call_args_imm()
+ * to get the real address offset.
+ * 2. For JIT (BPF_CALL): insn->off is the subprog id.
+ */
+ if (insn->code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL_ARGS))
+ insn->imm = bpf_call_args_imm(insn->off);
+ else
+ insn->imm = insn->off;
+
+ /* Avoid dumping a truncated and misleading pc-relative offset. */
+ if (call_off > S16_MAX || call_off < S16_MIN)
+ insn->off = 0;
+ else
+ insn->off = call_off;
+}
+
static struct bpf_insn *bpf_insn_prepare_dump(const struct bpf_prog *prog,
const struct cred *f_cred)
{
@@ -4944,6 +4967,9 @@ static struct bpf_insn *bpf_insn_prepare_dump(const struct bpf_prog *prog,
}
if (code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL) ||
code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL_ARGS)) {
+ /* Restore the legacy xlated dump layout. */
+ if (insns[i].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
+ prepare_dump_pseudo_call(&insns[i]);
if (code == (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL_ARGS))
insns[i].code = BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL;
if (!bpf_dump_raw_ok(f_cred))