diff options
| author | Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@shopee.com> | 2026-02-05 17:54:51 +0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> | 2026-02-10 11:24:47 +0100 |
| commit | ae88a5d2f29b69819dc7b04086734439d074a643 (patch) | |
| tree | 3df02b0285cddaa2f2543c4549058106ba3f31aa /net | |
| parent | 6d2f142b1e4b203387a92519d9d2e34752a79dbb (diff) | |
net: atm: fix crash due to unvalidated vcc pointer in sigd_send()
Reproducer available at [1].
The ATM send path (sendmsg -> vcc_sendmsg -> sigd_send) reads the vcc
pointer from msg->vcc and uses it directly without any validation. This
pointer comes from userspace via sendmsg() and can be arbitrarily forged:
int fd = socket(AF_ATMSVC, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
ioctl(fd, ATMSIGD_CTRL); // become ATM signaling daemon
struct msghdr msg = { .msg_iov = &iov, ... };
*(unsigned long *)(buf + 4) = 0xdeadbeef; // fake vcc pointer
sendmsg(fd, &msg, 0); // kernel dereferences 0xdeadbeef
In normal operation, the kernel sends the vcc pointer to the signaling
daemon via sigd_enq() when processing operations like connect(), bind(),
or listen(). The daemon is expected to return the same pointer when
responding. However, a malicious daemon can send arbitrary pointer values.
Fix this by introducing find_get_vcc() which validates the pointer by
searching through vcc_hash (similar to how sigd_close() iterates over
all VCCs), and acquires a reference via sock_hold() if found.
Since struct atm_vcc embeds struct sock as its first member, they share
the same lifetime. Therefore using sock_hold/sock_put is sufficient to
keep the vcc alive while it is being used.
Note that there may be a race with sigd_close() which could mark the vcc
with various flags (e.g., ATM_VF_RELEASED) after find_get_vcc() returns.
However, sock_hold() guarantees the memory remains valid, so this race
only affects the logical state, not memory safety.
[1]: https://gist.github.com/mrpre/1ba5949c45529c511152e2f4c755b0f3
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzbot+1f22cb1769f249df9fa0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/69039850.a70a0220.5b2ed.005d.GAE@google.com/T/
Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen <jiayuan.chen@shopee.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260205095501.131890-1-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'net')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/atm/signaling.c | 56 |
1 files changed, 54 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/net/atm/signaling.c b/net/atm/signaling.c index e70ae2c113f9..358fbe5e4d1d 100644 --- a/net/atm/signaling.c +++ b/net/atm/signaling.c @@ -22,6 +22,36 @@ struct atm_vcc *sigd = NULL; +/* + * find_get_vcc - validate and get a reference to a vcc pointer + * @vcc: the vcc pointer to validate + * + * This function validates that @vcc points to a registered VCC in vcc_hash. + * If found, it increments the socket reference count and returns the vcc. + * The caller must call sock_put(sk_atm(vcc)) when done. + * + * Returns the vcc pointer if valid, NULL otherwise. + */ +static struct atm_vcc *find_get_vcc(struct atm_vcc *vcc) +{ + int i; + + read_lock(&vcc_sklist_lock); + for (i = 0; i < VCC_HTABLE_SIZE; i++) { + struct sock *s; + + sk_for_each(s, &vcc_hash[i]) { + if (atm_sk(s) == vcc) { + sock_hold(s); + read_unlock(&vcc_sklist_lock); + return vcc; + } + } + } + read_unlock(&vcc_sklist_lock); + return NULL; +} + static void sigd_put_skb(struct sk_buff *skb) { if (!sigd) { @@ -69,7 +99,14 @@ static int sigd_send(struct atm_vcc *vcc, struct sk_buff *skb) msg = (struct atmsvc_msg *) skb->data; WARN_ON(refcount_sub_and_test(skb->truesize, &sk_atm(vcc)->sk_wmem_alloc)); - vcc = *(struct atm_vcc **) &msg->vcc; + + vcc = find_get_vcc(*(struct atm_vcc **)&msg->vcc); + if (!vcc) { + pr_debug("invalid vcc pointer in msg\n"); + dev_kfree_skb(skb); + return -EINVAL; + } + pr_debug("%d (0x%lx)\n", (int)msg->type, (unsigned long)vcc); sk = sk_atm(vcc); @@ -100,7 +137,16 @@ static int sigd_send(struct atm_vcc *vcc, struct sk_buff *skb) clear_bit(ATM_VF_WAITING, &vcc->flags); break; case as_indicate: - vcc = *(struct atm_vcc **)&msg->listen_vcc; + /* Release the reference from msg->vcc, we'll use msg->listen_vcc instead */ + sock_put(sk); + + vcc = find_get_vcc(*(struct atm_vcc **)&msg->listen_vcc); + if (!vcc) { + pr_debug("invalid listen_vcc pointer in msg\n"); + dev_kfree_skb(skb); + return -EINVAL; + } + sk = sk_atm(vcc); pr_debug("as_indicate!!!\n"); lock_sock(sk); @@ -115,6 +161,8 @@ static int sigd_send(struct atm_vcc *vcc, struct sk_buff *skb) sk->sk_state_change(sk); as_indicate_complete: release_sock(sk); + /* Paired with find_get_vcc(msg->listen_vcc) above */ + sock_put(sk); return 0; case as_close: set_bit(ATM_VF_RELEASED, &vcc->flags); @@ -131,11 +179,15 @@ as_indicate_complete: break; default: pr_alert("bad message type %d\n", (int)msg->type); + /* Paired with find_get_vcc(msg->vcc) above */ + sock_put(sk); return -EINVAL; } sk->sk_state_change(sk); out: dev_kfree_skb(skb); + /* Paired with find_get_vcc(msg->vcc) above */ + sock_put(sk); return 0; } |
