diff options
| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2026-08-04 11:00:18 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2026-08-04 11:00:18 -0700 |
| commit | 562bfb501c54a4d676528fbb70552f520fe6603b (patch) | |
| tree | 0fcc5998416007729a1293b2ea3cdaa8b2bbce04 /security | |
| parent | 7c350d079e79cccd6a30d7632fb3211e7f6fedb4 (diff) | |
| parent | b80bed5c871a80151351342c065579405ce77145 (diff) | |
Merge tag 'integrity-v7.2-rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity fixes from Mimi Zohar:
"Two IMA bug fixes: one addresses a potential integer underflow, the
other instantiates two LSM hooks"
* tag 'integrity-v7.2-rc7' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: Instantiate file_truncate and path_truncate hooks
ima: fix out-of-bounds read in xattr_verify()
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 9 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 39 |
2 files changed, 46 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 18d0d9154317..ced2e131b061 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -274,8 +274,13 @@ static int xattr_verify(enum ima_hooks func, struct ima_iint_cache *iint, } else { set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); } - if (xattr_len - sizeof(xattr_value->type) - hash_start >= - iint->ima_hash->length) + /* + * Use addition, not subtraction: sizeof() forces unsigned + * math and a short xattr_len would wrap around, bypassing + * this bounds check. + */ + if (xattr_len >= (int)sizeof(xattr_value->type) + hash_start + + (int)iint->ima_hash->length) /* * xattr length may be longer. md5 hash in previous * version occupied 20 bytes in xattr, instead of 16 diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 5cea53fc36df..ff52becc3031 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -687,6 +687,43 @@ static int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask) MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK, 0, false); } +/* + * ima_reset_action_flags - invalidate action flags after a content change + * @inode: inode of the file whose content is about to be truncated + * + * Clear IMA_DONE_MASK so the file is re-collected, re-measured, + * re-audited, and re-appraised on next access. + */ +static void ima_reset_action_flags(struct inode *inode) +{ + struct ima_iint_cache *iint; + + if (!ima_policy_flag || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) + return; + + iint = ima_iint_find(inode); + if (!iint) + return; + + mutex_lock(&iint->mutex); + iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK; + iint->measured_pcrs = 0; + mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex); + return; +} + +static int ima_path_truncate(const struct path *path) +{ + ima_reset_action_flags(path->dentry->d_inode); + return 0; +} + +static int ima_file_truncate(struct file *file) +{ + ima_reset_action_flags(file_inode(file)); + return 0; +} + static int __ima_inode_hash(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size) { @@ -1300,11 +1337,13 @@ static struct security_hook_list ima_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_release, ima_file_free), LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, ima_file_mmap), LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, ima_file_mprotect), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_truncate, ima_file_truncate), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, ima_load_data), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_post_load_data, ima_post_load_data), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, ima_read_file), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_post_read_file, ima_post_read_file), LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_post_mknod, ima_post_path_mknod), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_truncate, ima_path_truncate), #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_post_create_or_update, ima_post_key_create_or_update), #endif |
