diff options
| author | Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> | 2026-10-26 21:53:29 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> | 2026-10-29 14:35:13 +0100 |
| commit | bf5ba73c9bdd5e872eb35e801e429a3b526f8f04 (patch) | |
| tree | cf3af62a7930916dfb813c004fd6447b9ef5dba5 /tools/testing | |
| parent | 948e604aca8af30490accf7d46d44814ffa26f80 (diff) | |
userns: don't drop the exec securebits
SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE tell script
interpreters to only run what AT_EXECVE_CHECK allows and to refuse
interactive input. A service manager sets them together with their lock
bits so that nothing below it can turn them off again.
But set_cred_user_ns() resets all securebits to SECUREBITS_DEFAULT. So
any task that can create a user namespace sheds the locked exec bits
with a single unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) and joining one with setns() does
the same. The lock is pointless if anyone who may create a user
namespace can drop it, and that is pretty much everyone.
Resetting the other bits is fine. They are about how capabilities are
computed and a new user namespace starts out with a full set of
capabilities anyway. The exec bits grant nothing though. They are
restrictions a task placed on itself, just like no_new_privs which a
user namespace doesn't touch either. So keep them and their locks.
Reproducer:
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
/* Lock the exec securebits, then create a user namespace and look at them again. */
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <sched.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#define SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE (1 << 8)
#define SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED (1 << 9)
#define SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE (1 << 10)
#define SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE_LOCKED (1 << 11)
int main(void)
{
int bits = SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE | SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED |
SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE | SECBIT_EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE_LOCKED;
if (prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, bits, 0, 0, 0)) {
perror("PR_SET_SECUREBITS");
return 1;
}
printf("before: 0x%x\n", prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS, 0, 0, 0, 0));
printf("clear locked bits: %s\n", prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, 0, 0, 0, 0) ? "refused" : "ALLOWED");
if (unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER)) {
perror("unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER)");
return 1;
}
printf("after unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER): 0x%x\n", prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS, 0, 0, 0, 0));
return 0;
}
On v7.1 this prints "before: 0xf00", "clear locked bits: refused" and
"after unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER): 0x0". With this patch the last line
reads 0xf00 as well.
Fixes: a0623b2a1d59 ("security: Add EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE and EXEC_DENY_INTERACTIVE securebits")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.14+
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261026-work-securebits-userns-v1-1-b35473fa1a34@kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'tools/testing')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions
