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Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c28
1 files changed, 28 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 7d1d34e45310..86fd270a1d6e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -146,6 +146,14 @@ static bool sev_vcpu_has_debug_swap(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
return sev->vmsa_features & SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP;
}
+static bool snp_is_secure_tsc_enabled(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_info *sev = to_kvm_sev_info(kvm);
+
+ return (sev->vmsa_features & SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC) &&
+ !WARN_ON_ONCE(!sev_snp_guest(kvm));
+}
+
/* Must be called with the sev_bitmap_lock held */
static bool __sev_recycle_asids(unsigned int min_asid, unsigned int max_asid)
{
@@ -415,6 +423,9 @@ static int __sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp,
if (data->flags)
return -EINVAL;
+ if (!snp_active)
+ valid_vmsa_features &= ~SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC;
+
if (data->vmsa_features & ~valid_vmsa_features)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -2187,6 +2198,13 @@ static int snp_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
if (!(params.policy & SNP_POLICY_MASK_RSVD_MBO))
return -EINVAL;
+ if (snp_is_secure_tsc_enabled(kvm)) {
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!kvm->arch.default_tsc_khz))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ start.desired_tsc_khz = kvm->arch.default_tsc_khz;
+ }
+
sev->policy = params.policy;
sev->snp_context = snp_context_create(kvm, argp);
@@ -2195,6 +2213,7 @@ static int snp_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
start.gctx_paddr = __psp_pa(sev->snp_context);
start.policy = params.policy;
+
memcpy(start.gosvw, params.gosvw, sizeof(params.gosvw));
rc = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_SNP_LAUNCH_START, &start, &argp->error);
if (rc) {
@@ -3085,6 +3104,9 @@ out:
sev_supported_vmsa_features = 0;
if (sev_es_debug_swap_enabled)
sev_supported_vmsa_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP;
+
+ if (sev_snp_enabled && tsc_khz && cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SNP_SECURE_TSC))
+ sev_supported_vmsa_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC;
}
void sev_hardware_unsetup(void)
@@ -4452,6 +4474,9 @@ void sev_es_recalc_msr_intercepts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP) &&
!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDPID));
+ svm_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_AMD64_GUEST_TSC_FREQ, MSR_TYPE_R,
+ !snp_is_secure_tsc_enabled(vcpu->kvm));
+
/*
* For SEV-ES, accesses to MSR_IA32_XSS should not be intercepted if
* the host/guest supports its use.
@@ -4591,6 +4616,9 @@ int sev_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return -ENOMEM;
svm->sev_es.vmsa = page_address(vmsa_page);
+
+ vcpu->arch.guest_tsc_protected = snp_is_secure_tsc_enabled(vcpu->kvm);
+
return 0;
}