diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/net/ethernet/intel')
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c | 7 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_type.h | 7 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.c | 10 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.h | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.c | 71 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.h | 9 |
6 files changed, 53 insertions, 53 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c index 7107c279752a..44b94276df91 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_sriov.c @@ -204,8 +204,8 @@ void ice_free_vfs(struct ice_pf *pf) } /* clear malicious info since the VF is getting released */ - ice_mbx_clear_malvf(&hw->mbx_snapshot, pf->vfs.malvfs, - ICE_MAX_SRIOV_VFS, vf->vf_id); + ice_mbx_clear_malvf(&hw->mbx_snapshot, vf->vf_id, + &vf->mbx_info); mutex_unlock(&vf->cfg_lock); } @@ -1828,8 +1828,7 @@ ice_is_malicious_vf(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event, /* if the VF is malicious and we haven't let the user * know about it, then let them know now */ - status = ice_mbx_report_malvf(&pf->hw, pf->vfs.malvfs, - ICE_MAX_SRIOV_VFS, vf_id, + status = ice_mbx_report_malvf(&pf->hw, &vf->mbx_info, &report_vf); if (status) dev_dbg(dev, "Error reporting malicious VF\n"); diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_type.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_type.h index e3f622cad425..d243a0c59ea4 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_type.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_type.h @@ -794,6 +794,13 @@ struct ice_mbx_vf_counter { u32 vfcntr_len; }; +/* Structure used to track a single VF's messages on the mailbox: + * 1. malicious: whether this VF has been detected as malicious before + */ +struct ice_mbx_vf_info { + u8 malicious : 1; +}; + /* Structure to hold data relevant to the captured static snapshot * of the PF-VF mailbox. */ diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.c index 116b43588389..69e89e960950 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.c @@ -496,8 +496,8 @@ void ice_reset_all_vfs(struct ice_pf *pf) /* clear all malicious info if the VFs are getting reset */ ice_for_each_vf(pf, bkt, vf) - ice_mbx_clear_malvf(&hw->mbx_snapshot, pf->vfs.malvfs, - ICE_MAX_SRIOV_VFS, vf->vf_id); + ice_mbx_clear_malvf(&hw->mbx_snapshot, vf->vf_id, + &vf->mbx_info); /* If VFs have been disabled, there is no need to reset */ if (test_and_set_bit(ICE_VF_DIS, pf->state)) { @@ -703,8 +703,7 @@ int ice_reset_vf(struct ice_vf *vf, u32 flags) ice_eswitch_replay_vf_mac_rule(vf); /* if the VF has been reset allow it to come up again */ - ice_mbx_clear_malvf(&hw->mbx_snapshot, pf->vfs.malvfs, - ICE_MAX_SRIOV_VFS, vf->vf_id); + ice_mbx_clear_malvf(&hw->mbx_snapshot, vf->vf_id, &vf->mbx_info); out_unlock: if (flags & ICE_VF_RESET_LOCK) @@ -760,6 +759,9 @@ void ice_initialize_vf_entry(struct ice_vf *vf) ice_vf_ctrl_invalidate_vsi(vf); ice_vf_fdir_init(vf); + /* Initialize mailbox info for this VF */ + ice_mbx_init_vf_info(&pf->hw, &vf->mbx_info); + mutex_init(&vf->cfg_lock); } diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.h index ef30f05b5d02..e3cda6fb71ab 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_lib.h @@ -74,7 +74,6 @@ struct ice_vfs { u16 num_qps_per; /* number of queue pairs per VF */ u16 num_msix_per; /* number of MSI-X vectors per VF */ unsigned long last_printed_mdd_jiffies; /* MDD message rate limit */ - DECLARE_BITMAP(malvfs, ICE_MAX_SRIOV_VFS); /* malicious VF indicator */ }; /* VF information structure */ @@ -105,6 +104,7 @@ struct ice_vf { DECLARE_BITMAP(rxq_ena, ICE_MAX_RSS_QS_PER_VF); struct ice_vlan port_vlan_info; /* Port VLAN ID, QoS, and TPID */ struct virtchnl_vlan_caps vlan_v2_caps; + struct ice_mbx_vf_info mbx_info; u8 pf_set_mac:1; /* VF MAC address set by VMM admin */ u8 trusted:1; u8 spoofchk:1; diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.c index 9f6acfeb0fc6..2e769bd0bf7e 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.c @@ -345,35 +345,23 @@ ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(struct ice_hw *hw, /** * ice_mbx_report_malvf - Track and note malicious VF * @hw: pointer to the HW struct - * @all_malvfs: all malicious VFs tracked by PF - * @bitmap_len: length of bitmap in bits - * @vf_id: relative virtual function ID of the malicious VF + * @vf_info: the mailbox tracking info structure for a VF * @report_malvf: boolean to indicate if malicious VF must be reported * - * This function will update a bitmap that keeps track of the malicious - * VFs attached to the PF. A malicious VF must be reported only once if - * discovered between VF resets or loading so the function checks - * the input vf_id against the bitmap to verify if the VF has been - * detected in any previous mailbox iterations. + * This function updates the malicious indicator bit in the VF mailbox + * tracking structure. A malicious VF must be reported only once if discovered + * between VF resets or loading so the function first checks if the VF has + * already been detected in any previous mailbox iterations. */ int -ice_mbx_report_malvf(struct ice_hw *hw, unsigned long *all_malvfs, - u16 bitmap_len, u16 vf_id, bool *report_malvf) +ice_mbx_report_malvf(struct ice_hw *hw, struct ice_mbx_vf_info *vf_info, + bool *report_malvf) { - if (!all_malvfs || !report_malvf) - return -EINVAL; - - *report_malvf = false; - - if (bitmap_len < hw->mbx_snapshot.mbx_vf.vfcntr_len) + if (!report_malvf) return -EINVAL; - if (vf_id >= bitmap_len) - return -EIO; - - /* If the vf_id is found in the bitmap set bit and boolean to true */ - if (!test_and_set_bit(vf_id, all_malvfs)) - *report_malvf = true; + *report_malvf = !vf_info->malicious; + vf_info->malicious = 1; return 0; } @@ -381,33 +369,24 @@ ice_mbx_report_malvf(struct ice_hw *hw, unsigned long *all_malvfs, /** * ice_mbx_clear_malvf - Clear VF bitmap and counter for VF ID * @snap: pointer to the mailbox snapshot structure - * @all_malvfs: all malicious VFs tracked by PF - * @bitmap_len: length of bitmap in bits * @vf_id: relative virtual function ID of the malicious VF + * @vf_info: mailbox tracking structure for this VF * - * In case of a VF reset, this function can be called to clear - * the bit corresponding to the VF ID in the bitmap tracking all - * malicious VFs attached to the PF. The function also clears the - * VF counter array at the index of the VF ID. This is to ensure - * that the new VF loaded is not considered malicious before going - * through the overflow detection algorithm. - */ +* In case of a VF reset, this function shall be called to clear the VF's +* current mailbox tracking state. +*/ void -ice_mbx_clear_malvf(struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap, unsigned long *all_malvfs, - u16 bitmap_len, u16 vf_id) +ice_mbx_clear_malvf(struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap, u16 vf_id, + struct ice_mbx_vf_info *vf_info) { - if (WARN_ON(!snap || !all_malvfs)) - return; - - if (WARN_ON(bitmap_len < snap->mbx_vf.vfcntr_len)) + if (WARN_ON(!snap)) return; /* Ensure VF ID value is not larger than bitmap or VF counter length */ - if (WARN_ON(vf_id >= bitmap_len || vf_id >= snap->mbx_vf.vfcntr_len)) + if (WARN_ON(vf_id >= snap->mbx_vf.vfcntr_len)) return; - /* Clear VF ID bit in the bitmap tracking malicious VFs attached to PF */ - clear_bit(vf_id, all_malvfs); + vf_info->malicious = 0; /* Clear the VF counter in the mailbox snapshot structure for that VF ID. * This is to ensure that if a VF is unloaded and a new one brought back @@ -419,6 +398,18 @@ ice_mbx_clear_malvf(struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap, unsigned long *all_malvfs, } /** + * ice_mbx_init_vf_info - Initialize a new VF mailbox tracking info + * @hw: pointer to the hardware structure + * @vf_info: the mailbox tracking info structure for a VF + * + * Initialize a VF mailbox tracking info structure. + */ +void ice_mbx_init_vf_info(struct ice_hw *hw, struct ice_mbx_vf_info *vf_info) +{ + vf_info->malicious = 0; +} + +/** * ice_mbx_init_snapshot - Initialize mailbox snapshot structure * @hw: pointer to the hardware structure * @vf_count: number of VFs allocated on a PF diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.h index be593b951642..2613cba61ac7 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.h +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_vf_mbx.h @@ -23,13 +23,14 @@ int ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(struct ice_hw *hw, struct ice_mbx_data *mbx_data, u16 vf_id, bool *is_mal_vf); void -ice_mbx_clear_malvf(struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap, unsigned long *all_malvfs, - u16 bitmap_len, u16 vf_id); +ice_mbx_clear_malvf(struct ice_mbx_snapshot *snap, u16 vf_id, + struct ice_mbx_vf_info *vf_info); +void ice_mbx_init_vf_info(struct ice_hw *hw, struct ice_mbx_vf_info *vf_info); int ice_mbx_init_snapshot(struct ice_hw *hw, u16 vf_count); void ice_mbx_deinit_snapshot(struct ice_hw *hw); int -ice_mbx_report_malvf(struct ice_hw *hw, unsigned long *all_malvfs, - u16 bitmap_len, u16 vf_id, bool *report_malvf); +ice_mbx_report_malvf(struct ice_hw *hw, struct ice_mbx_vf_info *vf_info, + bool *report_malvf); #else /* CONFIG_PCI_IOV */ static inline int ice_aq_send_msg_to_vf(struct ice_hw __always_unused *hw, |