summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/fs/crypto/keysetup.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/crypto/keysetup.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/crypto/keysetup.c118
1 files changed, 74 insertions, 44 deletions
diff --git a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c
index ce327bfdada4..f905f9f94bdd 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c
@@ -163,13 +163,7 @@ int fscrypt_prepare_key(struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key,
tfm = fscrypt_allocate_skcipher(ci->ci_mode, raw_key, ci->ci_inode);
if (IS_ERR(tfm))
return PTR_ERR(tfm);
- /*
- * Pairs with the smp_load_acquire() in fscrypt_is_key_prepared().
- * I.e., here we publish ->tfm with a RELEASE barrier so that
- * concurrent tasks can ACQUIRE it. Note that this concurrency is only
- * possible for per-mode keys, not for per-file keys.
- */
- smp_store_release(&prep_key->tfm, tfm);
+ prep_key->tfm = tfm;
return 0;
}
@@ -190,9 +184,37 @@ int fscrypt_set_per_file_enc_key(struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci,
return fscrypt_prepare_key(&ci->ci_enc_key, raw_key, ci);
}
+/*
+ * Find the fscrypt_prepared_key (if any) for a particular (mk, hkdf_context,
+ * mode_num, data_unit_bits, inlinecrypt) combination.
+ *
+ * The caller must hold ->mk_sem for reading and ->mk_present must be true,
+ * ensuring that ->mk_mode_keys is still append-only.
+ */
+static struct fscrypt_prepared_key *
+fscrypt_find_mode_key(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk, u8 hkdf_context,
+ u8 mode_num, const struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci)
+{
+ struct fscrypt_mode_key *node;
+
+ /*
+ * The RCU read lock here is used only to synchronize with concurrent
+ * list_add_tail_rcu(). Concurrent deletions are impossible here, so
+ * returning a pointer to a node without taking any refcount is safe.
+ */
+ guard(rcu)();
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(node, &mk->mk_mode_keys, link) {
+ if (node->hkdf_context == hkdf_context &&
+ node->mode_num == mode_num &&
+ node->data_unit_bits == ci->ci_data_unit_bits &&
+ fscrypt_is_key_prepared(&node->key, ci))
+ return &node->key;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
static int setup_per_mode_enc_key(struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci,
struct fscrypt_master_key *mk,
- struct fscrypt_prepared_key *keys,
u8 hkdf_context, bool include_fs_uuid)
{
const struct inode *inode = ci->ci_inode;
@@ -200,7 +222,8 @@ static int setup_per_mode_enc_key(struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci,
struct fscrypt_mode *mode = ci->ci_mode;
const u8 mode_num = mode - fscrypt_modes;
struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key;
- u8 mode_key[FSCRYPT_MAX_RAW_KEY_SIZE];
+ struct fscrypt_mode_key *new_node;
+ u8 raw_mode_key[FSCRYPT_MAX_RAW_KEY_SIZE];
u8 hkdf_info[sizeof(mode_num) + sizeof(sb->s_uuid)];
unsigned int hkdf_infolen = 0;
bool use_hw_wrapped_key = false;
@@ -223,48 +246,56 @@ static int setup_per_mode_enc_key(struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci,
use_hw_wrapped_key = true;
}
- prep_key = &keys[mode_num];
- if (fscrypt_is_key_prepared(prep_key, ci)) {
+ prep_key = fscrypt_find_mode_key(mk, hkdf_context, mode_num, ci);
+ if (prep_key) {
ci->ci_enc_key = *prep_key;
return 0;
}
- mutex_lock(&fscrypt_mode_key_setup_mutex);
+ guard(mutex)(&fscrypt_mode_key_setup_mutex);
- if (fscrypt_is_key_prepared(prep_key, ci))
- goto done_unlock;
+ prep_key = fscrypt_find_mode_key(mk, hkdf_context, mode_num, ci);
+ if (prep_key) {
+ ci->ci_enc_key = *prep_key;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ new_node = kzalloc_obj(*new_node);
+ if (!new_node)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ new_node->hkdf_context = hkdf_context;
+ new_node->mode_num = mode_num;
+ new_node->data_unit_bits = ci->ci_data_unit_bits;
+ prep_key = &new_node->key;
if (use_hw_wrapped_key) {
err = fscrypt_prepare_inline_crypt_key(prep_key,
mk->mk_secret.bytes,
mk->mk_secret.size, true,
ci);
- if (err)
- goto out_unlock;
- goto done_unlock;
+ } else {
+ static_assert(sizeof(mode_num) == 1);
+ static_assert(sizeof(sb->s_uuid) == 16);
+ static_assert(sizeof(hkdf_info) == 17);
+ hkdf_info[hkdf_infolen++] = mode_num;
+ if (include_fs_uuid) {
+ memcpy(&hkdf_info[hkdf_infolen], &sb->s_uuid,
+ sizeof(sb->s_uuid));
+ hkdf_infolen += sizeof(sb->s_uuid);
+ }
+ fscrypt_hkdf_expand(&mk->mk_secret.hkdf, hkdf_context,
+ hkdf_info, hkdf_infolen, raw_mode_key,
+ mode->keysize);
+ err = fscrypt_prepare_key(prep_key, raw_mode_key, ci);
+ memzero_explicit(raw_mode_key, mode->keysize);
}
-
- BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(mode_num) != 1);
- BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(sb->s_uuid) != 16);
- BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(hkdf_info) != 17);
- hkdf_info[hkdf_infolen++] = mode_num;
- if (include_fs_uuid) {
- memcpy(&hkdf_info[hkdf_infolen], &sb->s_uuid,
- sizeof(sb->s_uuid));
- hkdf_infolen += sizeof(sb->s_uuid);
+ if (err) {
+ kfree(new_node);
+ return err;
}
- fscrypt_hkdf_expand(&mk->mk_secret.hkdf, hkdf_context, hkdf_info,
- hkdf_infolen, mode_key, mode->keysize);
- err = fscrypt_prepare_key(prep_key, mode_key, ci);
- memzero_explicit(mode_key, mode->keysize);
- if (err)
- goto out_unlock;
-done_unlock:
+ list_add_tail_rcu(&new_node->link, &mk->mk_mode_keys);
ci->ci_enc_key = *prep_key;
- err = 0;
-out_unlock:
- mutex_unlock(&fscrypt_mode_key_setup_mutex);
- return err;
+ return 0;
}
/*
@@ -311,8 +342,8 @@ static int fscrypt_setup_iv_ino_lblk_32_key(struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci,
{
int err;
- err = setup_per_mode_enc_key(ci, mk, mk->mk_iv_ino_lblk_32_keys,
- HKDF_CONTEXT_IV_INO_LBLK_32_KEY, true);
+ err = setup_per_mode_enc_key(ci, mk, HKDF_CONTEXT_IV_INO_LBLK_32_KEY,
+ true);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -364,8 +395,8 @@ static int fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key(struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci,
* encryption key. This ensures that the master key is
* consistently used only for HKDF, avoiding key reuse issues.
*/
- err = setup_per_mode_enc_key(ci, mk, mk->mk_direct_keys,
- HKDF_CONTEXT_DIRECT_KEY, false);
+ err = setup_per_mode_enc_key(ci, mk, HKDF_CONTEXT_DIRECT_KEY,
+ false);
} else if (ci->ci_policy.v2.flags &
FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_64) {
/*
@@ -374,9 +405,8 @@ static int fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key(struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci,
* the IVs. This format is optimized for use with inline
* encryption hardware compliant with the UFS standard.
*/
- err = setup_per_mode_enc_key(ci, mk, mk->mk_iv_ino_lblk_64_keys,
- HKDF_CONTEXT_IV_INO_LBLK_64_KEY,
- true);
+ err = setup_per_mode_enc_key(
+ ci, mk, HKDF_CONTEXT_IV_INO_LBLK_64_KEY, true);
} else if (ci->ci_policy.v2.flags &
FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32) {
err = fscrypt_setup_iv_ino_lblk_32_key(ci, mk);