diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'lib')
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/Kconfig.debug | 32 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | lib/debugobjects.c | 19 |
2 files changed, 21 insertions, 30 deletions
diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.debug b/lib/Kconfig.debug index 4e2dfbbd3d78..93f356d2b3d9 100644 --- a/lib/Kconfig.debug +++ b/lib/Kconfig.debug @@ -630,7 +630,7 @@ config DEBUG_FORCE_WEAK_PER_CPU config WARN_CONTEXT_ANALYSIS bool "Compiler context-analysis warnings" - depends on CC_IS_CLANG && CLANG_VERSION >= 220000 + depends on CC_IS_CLANG && CLANG_VERSION >= 220100 # Branch profiling re-defines "if", which messes with the compiler's # ability to analyze __cond_acquires(..), resulting in false positives. depends on !TRACE_BRANCH_PROFILING @@ -641,7 +641,7 @@ config WARN_CONTEXT_ANALYSIS and releasing user-definable "context locks". Clang's name of the feature is "Thread Safety Analysis". Requires - Clang 22 or later. + Clang 22.1.0 or later. Produces warnings by default. Select CONFIG_WERROR if you wish to turn these warnings into errors. @@ -760,6 +760,7 @@ source "mm/Kconfig.debug" config DEBUG_OBJECTS bool "Debug object operations" + depends on PREEMPT_COUNT || !DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT depends on DEBUG_KERNEL help If you say Y here, additional code will be inserted into the @@ -1766,33 +1767,6 @@ config STACKTRACE It is also used by various kernel debugging features that require stack trace generation. -config WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM - bool "Warn for all uses of unseeded randomness" - default n - help - Some parts of the kernel contain bugs relating to their use of - cryptographically secure random numbers before it's actually possible - to generate those numbers securely. This setting ensures that these - flaws don't go unnoticed, by enabling a message, should this ever - occur. This will allow people with obscure setups to know when things - are going wrong, so that they might contact developers about fixing - it. - - Unfortunately, on some models of some architectures getting - a fully seeded CRNG is extremely difficult, and so this can - result in dmesg getting spammed for a surprisingly long - time. This is really bad from a security perspective, and - so architecture maintainers really need to do what they can - to get the CRNG seeded sooner after the system is booted. - However, since users cannot do anything actionable to - address this, by default this option is disabled. - - Say Y here if you want to receive warnings for all uses of - unseeded randomness. This will be of use primarily for - those developers interested in improving the security of - Linux kernels running on their architecture (or - subarchitecture). - config DEBUG_KOBJECT bool "kobject debugging" depends on DEBUG_KERNEL diff --git a/lib/debugobjects.c b/lib/debugobjects.c index 89a1d6745dc2..12f50de85b62 100644 --- a/lib/debugobjects.c +++ b/lib/debugobjects.c @@ -398,9 +398,26 @@ static void fill_pool(void) atomic_inc(&cpus_allocating); while (pool_should_refill(&pool_global)) { + gfp_t gfp = __GFP_HIGH | __GFP_NOWARN; HLIST_HEAD(head); - if (!kmem_alloc_batch(&head, obj_cache, __GFP_HIGH | __GFP_NOWARN)) + /* + * Allow reclaim only in preemptible context and during + * early boot. If not preemptible, the caller might hold + * locks causing a deadlock in the allocator. + * + * If the reclaim flag is not set during early boot then + * allocations, which happen before deferred page + * initialization has completed, will fail. + * + * In preemptible context the flag is harmless and not a + * performance issue as that's usually invoked from slow + * path initialization context. + */ + if (preemptible() || system_state < SYSTEM_SCHEDULING) + gfp |= __GFP_KSWAPD_RECLAIM; + + if (!kmem_alloc_batch(&head, obj_cache, gfp)) break; guard(raw_spinlock_irqsave)(&pool_lock); |