| Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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No functional modification involved.
security/apparmor/file.c:184: warning: expecting prototype for aa_lookup_fperms(). Prototype was for aa_lookup_condperms() instead.
Reported-by: Abaci Robot <abaci@linux.alibaba.com>
Closes: https://bugzilla.openanolis.cn/show_bug.cgi?id=13605
Signed-off-by: Jiapeng Chong <jiapeng.chong@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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clang warns:
security/apparmor/label.c:206:15: error: address of array 'new->vec' will always evaluate to 'true' [-Werror,-Wpointer-bool-conversion]
206 | AA_BUG(!new->vec);
| ~~~~~~^~~
The address of this array can never be NULL because it is not at the
beginning of a structure. Convert the assertion to check that the new
pointer is not NULL.
Fixes: de4754c801f4 ("apparmor: carry mediation check on label")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202501191802.bDp2voTJ-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Add the const qualifier to all the ctl_tables in the tree except for
watchdog_hardlockup_sysctl, memory_allocation_profiling_sysctls,
loadpin_sysctl_table and the ones calling register_net_sysctl (./net,
drivers/inifiniband dirs). These are special cases as they use a
registration function with a non-const qualified ctl_table argument or
modify the arrays before passing them on to the registration function.
Constifying ctl_table structs will prevent the modification of
proc_handler function pointers as the arrays would reside in .rodata.
This is made possible after commit 78eb4ea25cd5 ("sysctl: treewide:
constify the ctl_table argument of proc_handlers") constified all the
proc_handlers.
Created this by running an spatch followed by a sed command:
Spatch:
virtual patch
@
depends on !(file in "net")
disable optional_qualifier
@
identifier table_name != {
watchdog_hardlockup_sysctl,
iwcm_ctl_table,
ucma_ctl_table,
memory_allocation_profiling_sysctls,
loadpin_sysctl_table
};
@@
+ const
struct ctl_table table_name [] = { ... };
sed:
sed --in-place \
-e "s/struct ctl_table .table = &uts_kern/const struct ctl_table *table = \&uts_kern/" \
kernel/utsname_sysctl.c
Reviewed-by: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org> # for kernel/trace/
Reviewed-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com> # SCSI
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> # xfs
Acked-by: Jani Nikula <jani.nikula@intel.com>
Acked-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Acked-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Bill O'Donnell <bodonnel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ashutosh Dixit <ashutosh.dixit@intel.com>
Acked-by: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Joel Granados <joel.granados@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore:
- Improved handling of LSM "secctx" strings through lsm_context struct
The LSM secctx string interface is from an older time when only one
LSM was supported, migrate over to the lsm_context struct to better
support the different LSMs we now have and make it easier to support
new LSMs in the future.
These changes explain the Rust, VFS, and networking changes in the
diffstat.
- Only build lsm_audit.c if CONFIG_SECURITY and CONFIG_AUDIT are
enabled
Small tweak to be a bit smarter about when we build the LSM's common
audit helpers.
- Check for absurdly large policies from userspace in SafeSetID
SafeSetID policies rules are fairly small, basically just "UID:UID",
it easy to impose a limit of KMALLOC_MAX_SIZE on policy writes which
helps quiet a number of syzbot related issues. While work is being
done to address the syzbot issues through other mechanisms, this is a
trivial and relatively safe fix that we can do now.
- Various minor improvements and cleanups
A collection of improvements to the kernel selftests, constification
of some function parameters, removing redundant assignments, and
local variable renames to improve readability.
* tag 'lsm-pr-20250121' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
lockdown: initialize local array before use to quiet static analysis
safesetid: check size of policy writes
net: corrections for security_secid_to_secctx returns
lsm: rename variable to avoid shadowing
lsm: constify function parameters
security: remove redundant assignment to return variable
lsm: Only build lsm_audit.c if CONFIG_SECURITY and CONFIG_AUDIT are set
selftests: refactor the lsm `flags_overset_lsm_set_self_attr` test
binder: initialize lsm_context structure
rust: replace lsm context+len with lsm_context
lsm: secctx provider check on release
lsm: lsm_context in security_dentry_init_security
lsm: use lsm_context in security_inode_getsecctx
lsm: replace context+len with lsm_context
lsm: ensure the correct LSM context releaser
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs
Pull misc vfs updates from Christian Brauner:
"Features:
- Support caching symlink lengths in inodes
The size is stored in a new union utilizing the same space as
i_devices, thus avoiding growing the struct or taking up any more
space
When utilized it dodges strlen() in vfs_readlink(), giving about
1.5% speed up when issuing readlink on /initrd.img on ext4
- Add RWF_DONTCACHE iocb and FOP_DONTCACHE file_operations flag
If a file system supports uncached buffered IO, it may set
FOP_DONTCACHE and enable support for RWF_DONTCACHE.
If RWF_DONTCACHE is attempted without the file system supporting
it, it'll get errored with -EOPNOTSUPP
- Enable VBOXGUEST and VBOXSF_FS on ARM64
Now that VirtualBox is able to run as a host on arm64 (e.g. the
Apple M3 processors) we can enable VBOXSF_FS (and in turn
VBOXGUEST) for this architecture.
Tested with various runs of bonnie++ and dbench on an Apple MacBook
Pro with the latest Virtualbox 7.1.4 r165100 installed
Cleanups:
- Delay sysctl_nr_open check in expand_files()
- Use kernel-doc includes in fiemap docbook
- Use page->private instead of page->index in watch_queue
- Use a consume fence in mnt_idmap() as it's heavily used in
link_path_walk()
- Replace magic number 7 with ARRAY_SIZE() in fc_log
- Sort out a stale comment about races between fd alloc and dup2()
- Fix return type of do_mount() from long to int
- Various cosmetic cleanups for the lockref code
Fixes:
- Annotate spinning as unlikely() in __read_seqcount_begin
The annotation already used to be there, but got lost in commit
52ac39e5db51 ("seqlock: seqcount_t: Implement all read APIs as
statement expressions")
- Fix proc_handler for sysctl_nr_open
- Flush delayed work in delayed fput()
- Fix grammar and spelling in propagate_umount()
- Fix ESP not readable during coredump
In /proc/PID/stat, there is the kstkesp field which is the stack
pointer of a thread. While the thread is active, this field reads
zero. But during a coredump, it should have a valid value
However, at the moment, kstkesp is zero even during coredump
- Don't wake up the writer if the pipe is still full
- Fix unbalanced user_access_end() in select code"
* tag 'vfs-6.14-rc1.misc' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs: (28 commits)
gfs2: use lockref_init for qd_lockref
erofs: use lockref_init for pcl->lockref
dcache: use lockref_init for d_lockref
lockref: add a lockref_init helper
lockref: drop superfluous externs
lockref: use bool for false/true returns
lockref: improve the lockref_get_not_zero description
lockref: remove lockref_put_not_zero
fs: Fix return type of do_mount() from long to int
select: Fix unbalanced user_access_end()
vbox: Enable VBOXGUEST and VBOXSF_FS on ARM64
pipe_read: don't wake up the writer if the pipe is still full
selftests: coredump: Add stackdump test
fs/proc: do_task_stat: Fix ESP not readable during coredump
fs: add RWF_DONTCACHE iocb and FOP_DONTCACHE file_operations flag
fs: sort out a stale comment about races between fd alloc and dup2
fs: Fix grammar and spelling in propagate_umount()
fs: fc_log replace magic number 7 with ARRAY_SIZE()
fs: use a consume fence in mnt_idmap()
file: flush delayed work in delayed fput()
...
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dbus permission queries need to be synced with fine grained unix
mediation to avoid potential policy regressions. To ensure that
dbus queries don't result in a case where fine grained unix mediation
is not being applied but dbus mediation is check the loaded policy
support ABI and abort the query if policy doesn't support the
v9 ABI.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Fine grained unix mediation in Ubuntu used ABI v7, and policy using
this has propogated onto systems where fine grained unix mediation was
not supported. The userspace policy compiler supports downgrading
policy so the policy could be shared without changes.
Unfortunately this had the side effect that policy was not updated for
the none Ubuntu systems and enabling fine grained unix mediation on
those systems means that a new kernel can break a system with existing
policy that worked with the previous kernel. With fine grained af_unix
mediation this regression can easily break the system causing boot to
fail, as it affect unix socket files, non-file based unix sockets, and
dbus communication.
To aoid this regression move fine grained af_unix mediation behind
a new abi. This means that the system's userspace and policy must
be updated to support the new policy before it takes affect and
dropping a new kernel on existing system will not result in a
regression.
The abi bump is done in such a way as existing policy can be activated
on the system by changing the policy abi declaration and existing unix
policy rules will apply. Policy then only needs to be incrementally
updated, can even be backported to existing Ubuntu policy.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Extend af_unix mediation to support fine grained controls based on
the type (abstract, anonymous, fs), the address, and the labeling
on the socket.
This allows for using socket addresses to label and the socket and
control which subjects can communicate.
The unix rule format follows standard apparmor rules except that fs
based unix sockets can be mediated by existing file rules. None fs
unix sockets can be mediated by a unix socket rule. Where The address
of an abstract unix domain socket begins with the @ character, similar
to how they are reported (as paths) by netstat -x. The address then
follows and may contain pattern matching and any characters including
the null character. In apparmor null characters must be specified by
using an escape sequence \000 or \x00. The pattern matching is the
same as is used by file path matching so * will not match / even
though it has no special meaning with in an abstract socket name. Eg.
allow unix addr=@*,
Autobound unix domain sockets have a unix sun_path assigned to them by
the kernel, as such specifying a policy based address is not possible.
The autobinding of sockets can be controlled by specifying the special
auto keyword. Eg.
allow unix addr=auto,
To indicate that the rule only applies to auto binding of unix domain
sockets. It is important to note this only applies to the bind
permission as once the socket is bound to an address it is
indistinguishable from a socket that have an addr bound with a
specified name. When the auto keyword is used with other permissions
or as part of a peer addr it will be replaced with a pattern that can
match an autobound socket. Eg. For some kernels
allow unix rw addr=auto,
It is important to note, this pattern may match abstract sockets that
were not autobound but have an addr that fits what is generated by the
kernel when autobinding a socket.
Anonymous unix domain sockets have no sun_path associated with the
socket address, however it can be specified with the special none
keyword to indicate the rule only applies to anonymous unix domain
sockets. Eg.
allow unix addr=none,
If the address component of a rule is not specified then the rule
applies to autobind, abstract and anonymous sockets.
The label on the socket can be compared using the standard label=
rule conditional. Eg.
allow unix addr=@foo peer=(label=bar),
see man apparmor.d for full syntax description.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Rework match_prot into a common fn that can be shared by all the
networking rules. This will provide compatibility with current socket
mediation, via the early bailout permission encoding.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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There is no need for the kern check to be in the critical section,
it only complicates the code and slows down the case where the
socket is being created by the kernel.
Lifting it out will also allow socket_create to share common template
code, with other socket_permission checks.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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The af_select macro just adds a layer of unnecessary abstraction that
makes following what the code is doing harder.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Currently the caps encoding is very limited and can't be used with
conditionals. Allow capabilities to be mediated by the state
machine. This will allow us to add conditionals to capabilities that
aren't possible with the current encoding.
This patch only adds support for using the state machine and retains
the old encoding lookup as part of the runtime mediation code to
support older policy abis. A follow on patch will move backwards
compatibility to a mapping function done at policy load time.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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x_table_lookup currently does stacking during label_parse() if the
target specifies a stack but its only caller ensures that it will
never be used with stacking.
Refactor to slightly simplify the code in x_to_label(), this
also fixes a long standing problem where x_to_labels check on stacking
is only on the first element to the table option list, instead of
the element that is found and used.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Previously apparmor has only sent SIGKILL but there are cases where
it can be useful to send a different signal. Allow the profile
to optionally specify a different value.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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This is a step towards merging the file and policy state machines.
With the switch to extended permissions the state machine's ACCEPT2
table became unused freeing it up to store state specific flags. The
first flags to be stored are FLAG_OWNER and FLAG other which paves the
way towards merging the file and policydb perms into a single
permission table.
Currently Lookups based on the objects ownership conditional will
still need separate fns, this will be address in a following patch.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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In order to speed up the mediated check, precompute and store the
result as a bit per class type. This will not only allow us to
speed up the mediation check but is also a step to removing the
unconfined special cases as the unconfined check can be replaced
with the generic label_mediates() check.
Note: label check does not currently work for capabilities and resources
which need to have their mediation updated first.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Provide semantics, via fn names, for some checks being done in
file_perm(). This is a preparatory patch for improvements to both
permission caching and delegation, where the check will become more
involved.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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There does not need to be an explicit restriction that unconfined
can't use change_hat. Traditionally unconfined doesn't have hats
so change_hat could not be used. But newer unconfined profiles have
the potential of having hats, and even system unconfined will be
able to be replaced with a profile that allows for hats.
To remain backwards compitible with expected return codes, continue
to return -EPERM if the unconfined profile does not have any hats.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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labels containing more than one entry need to accumulate flag info
from profiles that the label is constructed from. This is done
correctly for labels created by a merge but is not being done for
labels created by an update or directly created via a parse.
This technically is a bug fix, however the effect in current code is
to cause early unconfined bail out to not happen (ie. without the fix
it is slower) on labels that were created via update or a parse.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Currently signal mediation is using a hard coded form of the
RULE_MEDIATES check. This hides the intended semantics, and means this
specific check won't pickup any changes or improvements made in the
RULE_MEDIATES check. Switch to using RULE_MEDIATES().
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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profile_af_perm and profile_af_sk_perm are only ever called after
checking that the profile is not unconfined. So we can drop these
redundant checks.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Remove another case of code duplications. Switch to using the generic
routine instead of the current custom checks.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Make it so apparmor debug output can be controlled by class flags
as well as the debug flag on labels. This provides much finer
control at what is being output so apparmor doesn't flood the
logs with information that is not needed, making it hard to find
what is important.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Remove hard-coded strings by using the str_yes_no() helper function.
Fix a typo in a comment: s/unpritable/unprintable/
Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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When utilized it dodges strlen() in vfs_readlink(), giving about 1.5%
speed up when issuing readlink on /initrd.img on ext4.
Filesystems opt in by calling inode_set_cached_link() when creating an
inode.
The size is stored in a new union utilizing the same space as i_devices,
thus avoiding growing the struct or taking up any more space.
Churn-wise the current readlink_copy() helper is patched to accept the
size instead of calculating it.
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Guzik <mjguzik@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20241120112037.822078-2-mjguzik@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Verify that the LSM releasing the secctx is the LSM that
allocated it. This was not necessary when only one LSM could
create a secctx, but once there can be more than one it is.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Replace the (secctx,seclen) pointer pair with a single
lsm_context pointer to allow return of the LSM identifier
along with the context and context length. This allows
security_release_secctx() to know how to release the
context. Callers have been modified to use or save the
returned data from the new structure.
security_secid_to_secctx() and security_lsmproc_to_secctx()
will now return the length value on success instead of 0.
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: audit@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject tweak, kdoc fix, signedness fix from Dan Carpenter]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Add a new lsm_context data structure to hold all the information about a
"security context", including the string, its size and which LSM allocated
the string. The allocation information is necessary because LSMs have
different policies regarding the lifecycle of these strings. SELinux
allocates and destroys them on each use, whereas Smack provides a pointer
to an entry in a list that never goes away.
Update security_release_secctx() to use the lsm_context instead of a
(char *, len) pair. Change its callers to do likewise. The LSMs
supporting this hook have had comments added to remind the developer
that there is more work to be done.
The BPF security module provides all LSM hooks. While there has yet to
be a known instance of a BPF configuration that uses security contexts,
the possibility is real. In the existing implementation there is
potential for multiple frees in that case.
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: audit@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org
To: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Clean up the existing export namespace code along the same lines of
commit 33def8498fdd ("treewide: Convert macro and uses of __section(foo)
to __section("foo")") and for the same reason, it is not desired for the
namespace argument to be a macro expansion itself.
Scripted using
git grep -l -e MODULE_IMPORT_NS -e EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS | while read file;
do
awk -i inplace '
/^#define EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS/ {
gsub(/__stringify\(ns\)/, "ns");
print;
next;
}
/^#define MODULE_IMPORT_NS/ {
gsub(/__stringify\(ns\)/, "ns");
print;
next;
}
/MODULE_IMPORT_NS/ {
$0 = gensub(/MODULE_IMPORT_NS\(([^)]*)\)/, "MODULE_IMPORT_NS(\"\\1\")", "g");
}
/EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS/ {
if ($0 ~ /(EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS[^(]*)\(([^,]+),/) {
if ($0 !~ /(EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS[^(]*)\(([^,]+), ([^)]+)\)/ &&
$0 !~ /(EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS[^(]*)\(\)/ &&
$0 !~ /^my/) {
getline line;
gsub(/[[:space:]]*\\$/, "");
gsub(/[[:space:]]/, "", line);
$0 = $0 " " line;
}
$0 = gensub(/(EXPORT_SYMBOL_NS[^(]*)\(([^,]+), ([^)]+)\)/,
"\\1(\\2, \"\\3\")", "g");
}
}
{ print }' $file;
done
Requested-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://mail.google.com/mail/u/2/#inbox/FMfcgzQXKWgMmjdFwwdsfgxzKpVHWPlc
Acked-by: Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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the kernel test robot reports a C23 extension
warning: label followed by a declaration is a C23 extension
[-Wc23-extensions]
696 | struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL;
Instead of adding a null statement creating a C99 style inline var
declaration lift the label declaration out of the block so that it no
longer immediatedly follows the label.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202411101808.AI8YG6cs-lkp@intel.com/
Fixes: ee650b3820f3 ("apparmor: properly handle cx/px lookup failure for complain")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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The wording of 'scrubbing environment' implied that all environment
variables would be removed, when instead secure-execution mode only
removes a small number of environment variables. This patch updates the
wording to describe what actually occurs instead: setting AT_SECURE for
ld.so's secure-execution mode.
Link: https://gitlab.com/apparmor/apparmor/-/merge_requests/1315 is a
merge request that does similar updating for apparmor userspace.
Signed-off-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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The macros for label combination XXX_comb are no longer used and there
are no plans to use them so remove the dead code.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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In the macro definition of next_comb(), a parameter L1 is accepted,
but it is not used. Hence, it should be removed.
Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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The previous audit_cap cache deduping was based on the profile that was
being audited. This could cause confusion due to the deduplication then
occurring across multiple processes, which could happen if multiple
instances of binaries matched the same profile attachment (and thus ran
under the same profile) or a profile was attached to a container and its
processes.
Instead, perform audit_cap deduping over ad->subj_cred, which ensures the
deduping only occurs across a single process, instead of across all
processes that match the current one's profile.
Signed-off-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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When auditing capabilities, AppArmor uses a per-CPU, per-profile cache
such that the same capability for the same profile doesn't get repeatedly
audited, with the original goal of reducing audit logspam. However, this
cache does not have an expiration time, resulting in confusion when a
profile is shared across binaries (for example) and an expected DENIED
audit entry doesn't appear, despite the cache entry having been populated
much longer ago. This confusion was exacerbated by the per-CPU nature of
the cache resulting in the expected entries sporadically appearing when
the later denial+audit occurred on a different CPU.
To resolve this, record the last time a capability was audited for a
profile and add a timestamp expiration check before doing the audit.
v1 -> v2:
- Hardcode a longer timeout and drop the patches making it a sysctl,
after discussion with John Johansen.
- Cache the expiration time instead of the last-audited time. This value
can never be zero, which lets us drop the kernel_cap_t caps field from
the cache struct.
Signed-off-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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The profile_capabile function takes a struct apparmor_audit_data *ad,
which is documented as possibly being NULL. However, the single place that
calls this function never passes it a NULL ad. If we were ever to call
profile_capable with a NULL ad elsewhere, we would need to rework the
function, as its very first use of ad is to dereference ad->class without
checking if ad is NULL.
Thus, document profile_capable's ad parameter as not accepting NULL.
Signed-off-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Multiple profiles shared 'ent->caps', so some logs missed.
Fixes: 0ed3b28ab8bf ("AppArmor: mediation of non file objects")
Signed-off-by: chao liu <liuzgyid@outlook.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Add a comment to unpack_perm to document the first entry in the packed
perms struct is reserved, and make a non-functional change of unpacking
to a temporary stack variable named "reserved" to help suppor the
documentation of which value is reserved.
Suggested-by: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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The string allocated by kmemdup() in aa_unpack_strdup() is not
freed and cause following memory leaks, free them to fix it.
unreferenced object 0xffffff80c6af8a50 (size 8):
comm "kunit_try_catch", pid 225, jiffies 4294894407
hex dump (first 8 bytes):
74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 00 testing.
backtrace (crc 5eab668b):
[<0000000001e3714d>] kmemleak_alloc+0x34/0x40
[<000000006e6c7776>] __kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x300/0x3e0
[<000000006870467c>] kmemdup_noprof+0x34/0x60
[<000000001176bb03>] aa_unpack_strdup+0xd0/0x18c
[<000000008ecde918>] policy_unpack_test_unpack_strdup_with_null_name+0xf8/0x3ec
[<0000000032ef8f77>] kunit_try_run_case+0x13c/0x3ac
[<00000000f3edea23>] kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x80/0xec
[<00000000adf936cf>] kthread+0x2e8/0x374
[<0000000041bb1628>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
unreferenced object 0xffffff80c2a29090 (size 8):
comm "kunit_try_catch", pid 227, jiffies 4294894409
hex dump (first 8 bytes):
74 65 73 74 69 6e 67 00 testing.
backtrace (crc 5eab668b):
[<0000000001e3714d>] kmemleak_alloc+0x34/0x40
[<000000006e6c7776>] __kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x300/0x3e0
[<000000006870467c>] kmemdup_noprof+0x34/0x60
[<000000001176bb03>] aa_unpack_strdup+0xd0/0x18c
[<0000000046a45c1a>] policy_unpack_test_unpack_strdup_with_name+0xd0/0x3c4
[<0000000032ef8f77>] kunit_try_run_case+0x13c/0x3ac
[<00000000f3edea23>] kunit_generic_run_threadfn_adapter+0x80/0xec
[<00000000adf936cf>] kthread+0x2e8/0x374
[<0000000041bb1628>] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 4d944bcd4e73 ("apparmor: add AppArmor KUnit tests for policy unpack")
Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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aa_label_audit, aa_label_find, aa_label_seq_print and aa_update_label_name
were added by commit
f1bd904175e8 ("apparmor: add the base fns() for domain labels")
but never used.
aa_profile_label_perm was added by commit
637f688dc3dc ("apparmor: switch from profiles to using labels on contexts")
but never used.
aa_secid_update was added by commit
c092921219d2 ("apparmor: add support for mapping secids and using secctxes")
but never used.
aa_split_fqname has been unused since commit
3664268f19ea ("apparmor: add namespace lookup fns()")
aa_lookup_profile has been unused since commit
93c98a484c49 ("apparmor: move exec domain mediation to using labels")
aa_audit_perms_cb was only used by aa_profile_label_perm (see above).
All of these commits are from around 2017.
Remove them.
Signed-off-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <linux@treblig.org>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Since kvfree() already checks if its argument is NULL, an additional
check before calling kvfree() is unnecessary and can be removed.
Remove it and the following Coccinelle/coccicheck warning reported by
ifnullfree.cocci:
WARNING: NULL check before some freeing functions is not needed
Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Regression test of AppArmor finished without any failures.
PASSED: aa_exec access attach_disconnected at_secure introspect
capabilities changeprofile onexec changehat changehat_fork
changehat_misc chdir clone coredump deleted e2e environ exec exec_qual
fchdir fd_inheritance fork i18n link link_subset mkdir mmap mount
mult_mount named_pipe namespaces net_raw open openat pipe pivot_root
posix_ipc ptrace pwrite query_label regex rename readdir rw socketpair
swap sd_flags setattr symlink syscall sysv_ipc tcp unix_fd_server
unix_socket_pathname unix_socket_abstract unix_socket_unnamed
unix_socket_autobind unlink userns xattrs xattrs_profile longpath nfs
exec_stack aa_policy_cache nnp stackonexec stackprofile
FAILED:
make: Leaving directory '/apparmor/tests/regression/apparmor'
Signed-off-by: Leesoo Ahn <lsahn@ooseel.net>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Use the IS_ERR_OR_NULL() helper instead of open-coding a
NULL and an error pointer checks to simplify the code and
improve readability.
Signed-off-by: Hongbo Li <lihongbo22@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Currently the dfa state machine is limited by its default, next, and
check tables using u16. Allow loading of u32 tables, and if u16 tables
are loaded map them to u32.
The number of states allowed does not increase to 2^32 because the
base table uses the top 8 bits of its u32 for flags. Moving the flags
into a separate table allowing a full 2^32 bit range wil be done in
a separate patch.
Link: https://gitlab.com/apparmor/apparmor/-/issues/419
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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mode profiles
When a cx/px lookup fails, apparmor would deny execution of the binary
even in complain mode (where it would audit as allowing execution while
actually denying it). Instead, in complain mode, create a new learning
profile, just as would have been done if the cx/px line wasn't there.
Signed-off-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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attach->xmatch was not set when allocating a null profile, which is used in
complain mode to allocate a learning profile. This was causing downstream
failures in find_attach, which expected a valid xmatch but did not find
one under a certain sequence of profile transitions in complain mode.
This patch ensures the xmatch is set up properly for null profiles.
Signed-off-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull lsm updates from Paul Moore:
"Thirteen patches, all focused on moving away from the current 'secid'
LSM identifier to a richer 'lsm_prop' structure.
This move will help reduce the translation that is necessary in many
LSMs, offering better performance, and make it easier to support
different LSMs in the future"
* tag 'lsm-pr-20241112' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
lsm: remove lsm_prop scaffolding
netlabel,smack: use lsm_prop for audit data
audit: change context data from secid to lsm_prop
lsm: create new security_cred_getlsmprop LSM hook
audit: use an lsm_prop in audit_names
lsm: use lsm_prop in security_inode_getsecid
lsm: use lsm_prop in security_current_getsecid
audit: update shutdown LSM data
lsm: use lsm_prop in security_ipc_getsecid
audit: maintain an lsm_prop in audit_context
lsm: add lsmprop_to_secctx hook
lsm: use lsm_prop in security_audit_rule_match
lsm: add the lsm_prop data structure
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Remove the scaffold member from the lsm_prop. Remove the
remaining places it is being set.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subj line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Change the security_current_getsecid_subj() and
security_task_getsecid_obj() interfaces to fill in a lsm_prop structure
instead of a u32 secid. Audit interfaces will need to collect all
possible security data for possible reporting.
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: audit@vger.kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Add a new hook security_lsmprop_to_secctx() and its LSM specific
implementations. The LSM specific code will use the lsm_prop element
allocated for that module. This allows for the possibility that more
than one module may be called upon to translate a secid to a string,
as can occur in the audit code.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
[PM: subject line tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
|
