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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs
Pull vfs i_ino updates from Christian Brauner:
"For historical reasons, the inode->i_ino field is an unsigned long,
which means that it's 32 bits on 32 bit architectures. This has caused
a number of filesystems to implement hacks to hash a 64-bit identifier
into a 32-bit field, and deprives us of a universal identifier field
for an inode.
This changes the inode->i_ino field from an unsigned long to a u64.
This shouldn't make any material difference on 64-bit hosts, but
32-bit hosts will see struct inode grow by at least 4 bytes. This
could have effects on slabcache sizes and field alignment.
The bulk of the changes are to format strings and tracepoints, since
the kernel itself doesn't care that much about the i_ino field. The
first patch changes some vfs function arguments, so check that one out
carefully.
With this change, we may be able to shrink some inode structures. For
instance, struct nfs_inode has a fileid field that holds the 64-bit
inode number. With this set of changes, that field could be
eliminated. I'd rather leave that sort of cleanups for later just to
keep this simple"
* tag 'vfs-7.1-rc1.kino' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs:
nilfs2: fix 64-bit division operations in nilfs_bmap_find_target_in_group()
EVM: add comment describing why ino field is still unsigned long
vfs: remove externs from fs.h on functions modified by i_ino widening
treewide: fix missed i_ino format specifier conversions
ext4: fix signed format specifier in ext4_load_inode trace event
treewide: change inode->i_ino from unsigned long to u64
nilfs2: widen trace event i_ino fields to u64
f2fs: widen trace event i_ino fields to u64
ext4: widen trace event i_ino fields to u64
zonefs: widen trace event i_ino fields to u64
hugetlbfs: widen trace event i_ino fields to u64
ext2: widen trace event i_ino fields to u64
cachefiles: widen trace event i_ino fields to u64
vfs: widen trace event i_ino fields to u64
net: change sock.sk_ino and sock_i_ino() to u64
audit: widen ino fields to u64
vfs: widen inode hash/lookup functions to u64
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs
Pull vfs directory updates from Christian Brauner:
"Recently 'start_creating', 'start_removing', 'start_renaming' and
related interfaces were added which combine the locking and the
lookup.
At that time many callers were changed to use the new interfaces.
However there are still an assortment of places out side of the core
vfs where the directory is locked explictly, whether with inode_lock()
or lock_rename() or similar. These were missed in the first pass for
an assortment of uninteresting reasons.
This addresses the remaining places where explicit locking is used,
and changes them to use the new interfaces, or otherwise removes the
explicit locking.
The biggest changes are in overlayfs. The other changes are quite
simple, though maybe the cachefiles changes is the least simple of
those"
* tag 'vfs-7.1-rc1.directory' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs:
VFS: unexport lock_rename(), lock_rename_child(), unlock_rename()
ovl: remove ovl_lock_rename_workdir()
ovl: use is_subdir() for testing if one thing is a subdir of another
ovl: change ovl_create_real() to get a new lock when re-opening created file.
ovl: pass name buffer to ovl_start_creating_temp()
cachefiles: change cachefiles_bury_object to use start_renaming_dentry()
ovl: Simplify ovl_lookup_real_one()
VFS: make lookup_one_qstr_excl() static.
nfsd: switch purge_old() to use start_removing_noperm()
selinux: Use simple_start_creating() / simple_done_creating()
Apparmor: Use simple_start_creating() / simple_done_creating()
libfs: change simple_done_creating() to use end_creating()
VFS: move the start_dirop() kerndoc comment to before start_dirop()
fs/proc: Don't lock root inode when creating "self" and "thread-self"
VFS: note error returns in documentation for various lookup functions
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AppArmor was putting the reference to i_private data on its end after
removing the original entry from the file system. However the inode
can aand does live beyond that point and it is possible that some of
the fs call back functions will be invoked after the reference has
been put, which results in a race between freeing the data and
accessing it through the fs.
While the rawdata/loaddata is the most likely candidate to fail the
race, as it has the fewest references. If properly crafted it might be
possible to trigger a race for the other types stored in i_private.
Fix this by moving the put of i_private referenced data to the correct
place which is during inode eviction.
Fixes: c961ee5f21b20 ("apparmor: convert from securityfs to apparmorfs for policy ns files")
Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com>
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxime Bélair <maxime.belair@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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There is a race condition that leads to a use-after-free situation:
because the rawdata inodes are not refcounted, an attacker can start
open()ing one of the rawdata files, and at the same time remove the
last reference to this rawdata (by removing the corresponding profile,
for example), which frees its struct aa_loaddata; as a result, when
seq_rawdata_open() is reached, i_private is a dangling pointer and
freed memory is accessed.
The rawdata inodes weren't refcounted to avoid a circular refcount and
were supposed to be held by the profile rawdata reference. However
during profile removal there is a window where the vfs and profile
destruction race, resulting in the use after free.
Fix this by moving to a double refcount scheme. Where the profile
refcount on rawdata is used to break the circular dependency. Allowing
for freeing of the rawdata once all inode references to the rawdata
are put.
Fixes: 5d5182cae401 ("apparmor: move to per loaddata files, instead of replicating in profiles")
Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com>
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Maxime Bélair <maxime.belair@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Differential encoding allows loops to be created if it is abused. To
prevent this the unpack should verify that a diff-encode chain
terminates.
Unfortunately the differential encode verification had two bugs.
1. it conflated states that had gone through check and already been
marked, with states that were currently being checked and marked.
This means that loops in the current chain being verified are treated
as a chain that has already been verified.
2. the order bailout on already checked states compared current chain
check iterators j,k instead of using the outer loop iterator i.
Meaning a step backwards in states in the current chain verification
was being mistaken for moving to an already verified state.
Move to a double mark scheme where already verified states get a
different mark, than the current chain being kept. This enables us
to also drop the backwards verification check that was the cause of
the second error as any already verified state is already marked.
Fixes: 031dcc8f4e84 ("apparmor: dfa add support for state differential encoding")
Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com>
Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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An unprivileged local user can load, replace, and remove profiles by
opening the apparmorfs interfaces, via a confused deputy attack, by
passing the opened fd to a privileged process, and getting the
privileged process to write to the interface.
This does require a privileged target that can be manipulated to do
the write for the unprivileged process, but once such access is
achieved full policy management is possible and all the possible
implications that implies: removing confinement, DoS of system or
target applications by denying all execution, by-passing the
unprivileged user namespace restriction, to exploiting kernel bugs for
a local privilege escalation.
The policy management interface can not have its permissions simply
changed from 0666 to 0600 because non-root processes need to be able
to load policy to different policy namespaces.
Instead ensure the task writing the interface has privileges that
are a subset of the task that opened the interface. This is already
done via policy for confined processes, but unconfined can delegate
access to the opened fd, by-passing the usual policy check.
Fixes: b7fd2c0340eac ("apparmor: add per policy ns .load, .replace, .remove interface files")
Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com>
Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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if ns_name is NULL after
1071 error = aa_unpack(udata, &lh, &ns_name);
and if ent->ns_name contains an ns_name in
1089 } else if (ent->ns_name) {
then ns_name is assigned the ent->ns_name
1095 ns_name = ent->ns_name;
however ent->ns_name is freed at
1262 aa_load_ent_free(ent);
and then again when freeing ns_name at
1270 kfree(ns_name);
Fix this by NULLing out ent->ns_name after it is transferred to ns_name
Fixes: 145a0ef21c8e9 ("apparmor: fix blob compression when ns is forced on a policy load
")
Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com>
Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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The verify_dfa() function only checks DEFAULT_TABLE bounds when the state
is not differentially encoded.
When the verification loop traverses the differential encoding chain,
it reads k = DEFAULT_TABLE[j] and uses k as an array index without
validation. A malformed DFA with DEFAULT_TABLE[j] >= state_count,
therefore, causes both out-of-bounds reads and writes.
[ 57.179855] ==================================================================
[ 57.180549] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in verify_dfa+0x59a/0x660
[ 57.180904] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888100eadec4 by task su/993
[ 57.181554] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 993 Comm: su Not tainted 6.19.0-rc7-next-20260127 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
[ 57.181558] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[ 57.181563] Call Trace:
[ 57.181572] <TASK>
[ 57.181577] dump_stack_lvl+0x5e/0x80
[ 57.181596] print_report+0xc8/0x270
[ 57.181605] ? verify_dfa+0x59a/0x660
[ 57.181608] kasan_report+0x118/0x150
[ 57.181620] ? verify_dfa+0x59a/0x660
[ 57.181623] verify_dfa+0x59a/0x660
[ 57.181627] aa_dfa_unpack+0x1610/0x1740
[ 57.181629] ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x1d0/0x470
[ 57.181640] unpack_pdb+0x86d/0x46b0
[ 57.181647] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 57.181653] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 57.181656] ? aa_unpack_nameX+0x1a8/0x300
[ 57.181659] aa_unpack+0x20b0/0x4c30
[ 57.181662] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 57.181664] ? stack_depot_save_flags+0x33/0x700
[ 57.181681] ? kasan_save_track+0x4f/0x80
[ 57.181683] ? kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80
[ 57.181686] ? __kasan_kmalloc+0x93/0xb0
[ 57.181688] ? __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x44a/0x780
[ 57.181693] ? aa_simple_write_to_buffer+0x54/0x130
[ 57.181697] ? policy_update+0x154/0x330
[ 57.181704] aa_replace_profiles+0x15a/0x1dd0
[ 57.181707] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 57.181710] ? __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x44a/0x780
[ 57.181712] ? aa_loaddata_alloc+0x77/0x140
[ 57.181715] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 57.181717] ? _copy_from_user+0x2a/0x70
[ 57.181730] policy_update+0x17a/0x330
[ 57.181733] profile_replace+0x153/0x1a0
[ 57.181735] ? rw_verify_area+0x93/0x2d0
[ 57.181740] vfs_write+0x235/0xab0
[ 57.181745] ksys_write+0xb0/0x170
[ 57.181748] do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x660
[ 57.181762] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[ 57.181765] RIP: 0033:0x7f6192792eb2
Remove the MATCH_FLAG_DIFF_ENCODE condition to validate all DEFAULT_TABLE
entries unconditionally.
Fixes: 031dcc8f4e84 ("apparmor: dfa add support for state differential encoding")
Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com>
Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Massimiliano Pellizzer <massimiliano.pellizzer@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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The match_char() macro evaluates its character parameter multiple
times when traversing differential encoding chains. When invoked
with *str++, the string pointer advances on each iteration of the
inner do-while loop, causing the DFA to check different characters
at each iteration and therefore skip input characters.
This results in out-of-bounds reads when the pointer advances past
the input buffer boundary.
[ 94.984676] ==================================================================
[ 94.985301] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in aa_dfa_match+0x5ae/0x760
[ 94.985655] Read of size 1 at addr ffff888100342000 by task file/976
[ 94.986319] CPU: 7 UID: 1000 PID: 976 Comm: file Not tainted 6.19.0-rc7-next-20260127 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
[ 94.986322] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[ 94.986329] Call Trace:
[ 94.986341] <TASK>
[ 94.986347] dump_stack_lvl+0x5e/0x80
[ 94.986374] print_report+0xc8/0x270
[ 94.986384] ? aa_dfa_match+0x5ae/0x760
[ 94.986388] kasan_report+0x118/0x150
[ 94.986401] ? aa_dfa_match+0x5ae/0x760
[ 94.986405] aa_dfa_match+0x5ae/0x760
[ 94.986408] __aa_path_perm+0x131/0x400
[ 94.986418] aa_path_perm+0x219/0x2f0
[ 94.986424] apparmor_file_open+0x345/0x570
[ 94.986431] security_file_open+0x5c/0x140
[ 94.986442] do_dentry_open+0x2f6/0x1120
[ 94.986450] vfs_open+0x38/0x2b0
[ 94.986453] ? may_open+0x1e2/0x2b0
[ 94.986466] path_openat+0x231b/0x2b30
[ 94.986469] ? __x64_sys_openat+0xf8/0x130
[ 94.986477] do_file_open+0x19d/0x360
[ 94.986487] do_sys_openat2+0x98/0x100
[ 94.986491] __x64_sys_openat+0xf8/0x130
[ 94.986499] do_syscall_64+0x8e/0x660
[ 94.986515] ? count_memcg_events+0x15f/0x3c0
[ 94.986526] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 94.986540] ? handle_mm_fault+0x1639/0x1ef0
[ 94.986551] ? vma_start_read+0xf0/0x320
[ 94.986558] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 94.986561] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 94.986563] ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x50/0xe0
[ 94.986572] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 94.986574] ? arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x9/0xb0
[ 94.986587] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 94.986588] ? irqentry_exit+0x3c/0x590
[ 94.986595] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[ 94.986597] RIP: 0033:0x7fda4a79c3ea
Fix by extracting the character value before invoking match_char,
ensuring single evaluation per outer loop.
Fixes: 074c1cd798cb ("apparmor: dfa move character match into a macro")
Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com>
Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Massimiliano Pellizzer <massimiliano.pellizzer@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Currently the number of policy namespaces is not bounded relying on
the user namespace limit. However policy namespaces aren't strictly
tied to user namespaces and it is possible to create them and nest
them arbitrarily deep which can be used to exhaust system resource.
Hard cap policy namespaces to the same depth as user namespaces.
Fixes: c88d4c7b049e8 ("AppArmor: core policy routines")
Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com>
Reviewed-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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The profile removal code uses recursion when removing nested profiles,
which can lead to kernel stack exhaustion and system crashes.
Reproducer:
$ pf='a'; for ((i=0; i<1024; i++)); do
echo -e "profile $pf { \n }" | apparmor_parser -K -a;
pf="$pf//x";
done
$ echo -n a > /sys/kernel/security/apparmor/.remove
Replace the recursive __aa_profile_list_release() approach with an
iterative approach in __remove_profile(). The function repeatedly
finds and removes leaf profiles until the entire subtree is removed,
maintaining the same removal semantic without recursion.
Fixes: c88d4c7b049e ("AppArmor: core policy routines")
Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com>
Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Massimiliano Pellizzer <massimiliano.pellizzer@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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The function sets `*ns = NULL` on every call, leaking the namespace
string allocated in previous iterations when multiple profiles are
unpacked. This also breaks namespace consistency checking since *ns
is always NULL when the comparison is made.
Remove the incorrect assignment.
The caller (aa_unpack) initializes *ns to NULL once before the loop,
which is sufficient.
Fixes: dd51c8485763 ("apparmor: provide base for multiple profiles to be replaced at once")
Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com>
Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Massimiliano Pellizzer <massimiliano.pellizzer@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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Start states are read from untrusted data and used as indexes into the
DFA state tables. The aa_dfa_next() function call in unpack_pdb() will
access dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE][start], and if the start state exceeds
the number of states in the DFA, this results in an out-of-bound read.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in aa_dfa_next+0x2a1/0x360
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88811956fb90 by task su/1097
...
Reject policies with out-of-bounds start states during unpacking
to prevent the issue.
Fixes: ad5ff3db53c6 ("AppArmor: Add ability to load extended policy")
Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com>
Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Massimiliano Pellizzer <massimiliano.pellizzer@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
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On 32-bit architectures, unsigned long is only 32 bits wide, which
causes 64-bit inode numbers to be silently truncated. Several
filesystems (NFS, XFS, BTRFS, etc.) can generate inode numbers that
exceed 32 bits, and this truncation can lead to inode number collisions
and other subtle bugs on 32-bit systems.
Change the type of inode->i_ino from unsigned long to u64 to ensure that
inode numbers are always represented as 64-bit values regardless of
architecture. Update all format specifiers treewide from %lu/%lx to
%llu/%llx to match the new type, along with corresponding local variable
types.
This is the bulk treewide conversion. Earlier patches in this series
handled trace events separately to allow trace field reordering for
better struct packing on 32-bit.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260304-iino-u64-v3-12-2257ad83d372@kernel.org
Acked-by: Damien Le Moal <dlemoal@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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Instead of explicitly locking the parent and performing a look up in
apparmor, use simple_start_creating(), and then simple_done_creating()
to unlock and drop the dentry.
This removes the need to check for an existing entry (as
simple_start_creating() acts like an exclusive create and can return
-EEXIST), simplifies error paths, and keeps dir locking code
centralised.
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neil@brown.name>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260224222542.3458677-6-neilb@ownmail.net
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
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This converts some of the visually simpler cases that have been split
over multiple lines. I only did the ones that are easy to verify the
resulting diff by having just that final GFP_KERNEL argument on the next
line.
Somebody should probably do a proper coccinelle script for this, but for
me the trivial script actually resulted in an assertion failure in the
middle of the script. I probably had made it a bit _too_ trivial.
So after fighting that far a while I decided to just do some of the
syntactically simpler cases with variations of the previous 'sed'
scripts.
The more syntactically complex multi-line cases would mostly really want
whitespace cleanup anyway.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This was done entirely with mindless brute force, using
git grep -l '\<k[vmz]*alloc_objs*(.*, GFP_KERNEL)' |
xargs sed -i 's/\(alloc_objs*(.*\), GFP_KERNEL)/\1)/'
to convert the new alloc_obj() users that had a simple GFP_KERNEL
argument to just drop that argument.
Note that due to the extreme simplicity of the scripting, any slightly
more complex cases spread over multiple lines would not be triggered:
they definitely exist, but this covers the vast bulk of the cases, and
the resulting diff is also then easier to check automatically.
For the same reason the 'flex' versions will be done as a separate
conversion.
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
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This is the result of running the Coccinelle script from
scripts/coccinelle/api/kmalloc_objs.cocci. The script is designed to
avoid scalar types (which need careful case-by-case checking), and
instead replace kmalloc-family calls that allocate struct or union
object instances:
Single allocations: kmalloc(sizeof(TYPE), ...)
are replaced with: kmalloc_obj(TYPE, ...)
Array allocations: kmalloc_array(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE), ...)
are replaced with: kmalloc_objs(TYPE, COUNT, ...)
Flex array allocations: kmalloc(struct_size(PTR, FAM, COUNT), ...)
are replaced with: kmalloc_flex(*PTR, FAM, COUNT, ...)
(where TYPE may also be *VAR)
The resulting allocations no longer return "void *", instead returning
"TYPE *".
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
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Smatch static checker warning:
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:966 unpack_pdb()
warn: unsigned 'unpack_tags(e, &pdb->tags, info)' is never less than zero.
unpack_tags() is declared with return type size_t (unsigned) but returns
negative errno values on failure. The caller in unpack_pdb() tests the
return with `< 0`, which is always false for an unsigned type, making
error handling dead code. Malformed tag data would be silently accepted
instead of causing a load failure.
Change return type of unpack_tags() from size_t to int to match the
functions's actual semantic.
Fixes: 3d28e2397af7 ("apparmor: add support loading per permission tagging")
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Massimiliano Pellizzer <mpellizzer.dev@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
if debugging is enabled the DEBUG statement will fail do to a bad
fat fingered cast.
Fixes: 102ada7ca37ed ("apparmor: fix fmt string type error in process_strs_entry")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
aa-label_match is not correctly returning the state in all cases.
The only reason this didn't cause a error is that all callers currently
ignore the return value.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202602020631.wXgZosyU-lkp@intel.com/
Fixes: a4c9efa4dbad6 ("apparmor: make label_match return a consistent value")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
pointer subtraction has a type of int when using clang on hexagon,
microblaze (and possibly other archs). We know the subtraction is
postive so cast the expression to unsigned long to match what is in
the fmt string.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202602021429.CcmWkR9K-lkp@intel.com/
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202602021427.PvvDjgyL-lkp@intel.com/
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202602021510.JPzX5zKb-lkp@intel.com/
Fixes: c140dcd1246bf ("apparmor: make str table more generic and be able to have multiple entries")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
subns was renamed inview to better reflect the function of the flag.
Unfortunately the kernel-doc was not properly updated in 2 places.
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202602020737.vGCZFds1-lkp@intel.com/
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202602021427.PvvDjgyL-lkp@intel.com/
Fixes: 796c146fa6c82 ("apparmor: split xxx_in_ns into its two separate semantic use cases")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
If the export_binary parameter is disabled on runtime, profiles that
were loaded before that will still have their rawdata stored in
apparmorfs, with a symbolic link to the rawdata on the policy
directory. When one of those profiles are replaced, the rawdata is set
to NULL, but when trying to resolve the symbolic links to rawdata for
that profile, it will try to dereference profile->rawdata->name when
profile->rawdata is now NULL causing an oops. Fix it by checking if
rawdata is set.
[ 168.653080] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000088
[ 168.657420] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 168.660619] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 168.663613] PGD 0 P4D 0
[ 168.665450] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[ 168.667836] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1729 Comm: ls Not tainted 6.19.0-rc7+ #3 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[ 168.672308] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[ 168.679327] RIP: 0010:rawdata_get_link_base.isra.0+0x23/0x330
[ 168.682768] Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 48 83 ec 18 48 89 55 d0 48 85 ff 0f 84 e3 01 00 00 <48> 83 3c 25 88 00 00 00 00 0f 84 d4 01 00 00 49 89 f6 49 89 cc e8
[ 168.689818] RSP: 0018:ffffcdcb8200fb80 EFLAGS: 00010282
[ 168.690871] RAX: ffffffffaee74ec0 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffffb0120158
[ 168.692251] RDX: ffffcdcb8200fbe0 RSI: ffff88c187c9fa80 RDI: ffff88c186c98a80
[ 168.693593] RBP: ffffcdcb8200fbc0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 168.694941] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88c186c98a80
[ 168.696289] R13: 00007fff005aaa20 R14: 0000000000000080 R15: ffff88c188f4fce0
[ 168.697637] FS: 0000790e81c58280(0000) GS:ffff88c20a957000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 168.699227] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 168.700349] CR2: 0000000000000088 CR3: 000000012fd3e000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0
[ 168.701696] Call Trace:
[ 168.702325] <TASK>
[ 168.702995] rawdata_get_link_data+0x1c/0x30
[ 168.704145] vfs_readlink+0xd4/0x160
[ 168.705152] do_readlinkat+0x114/0x180
[ 168.706214] __x64_sys_readlink+0x1e/0x30
[ 168.708653] x64_sys_call+0x1d77/0x26b0
[ 168.709525] do_syscall_64+0x81/0x500
[ 168.710348] ? do_statx+0x72/0xb0
[ 168.711109] ? putname+0x3e/0x80
[ 168.711845] ? __x64_sys_statx+0xb7/0x100
[ 168.712711] ? x64_sys_call+0x10fc/0x26b0
[ 168.713577] ? do_syscall_64+0xbf/0x500
[ 168.714412] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x1d2/0x8d0
[ 168.715404] ? irqentry_exit+0xb2/0x740
[ 168.716359] ? exc_page_fault+0x90/0x1b0
[ 168.717307] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
Fixes: 1180b4c757aab ("apparmor: fix dangling symlinks to policy rawdata after replacement")
Signed-off-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
Add .kunitconfig file to the AppArmor directory to enable easy execution of
KUnit tests.
AppArmor tests (CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_KUNIT_TEST) depend on
CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR which also depends on CONFIG_SECURITY and
CONFIG_NET. Without explicitly enabling these configs in the .kunitconfig,
developers will need to specify config manually.
With the .kunitconfig, developers can run the tests:
$ ./tools/testing/kunit/kunit.py run --kunitconfig security/apparmor
Signed-off-by: Ryota Sakamoto <sakamo.ryota@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
There are two unused percpu critical sections in the buffer management
code. These are remanents from when a more complex hold algorithm was
used. Remove them, as they serve no purpose.
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
The buffer hold is a measure of contention, but it is tracked per cpu
where the lock is a globabl resource. On some systems (eg. real time)
there is no guarantee that the code will be on the same cpu pre, and
post spinlock acquisition, nor that the buffer will be put back to
the same percpu cache when we are done with it.
Because of this the hold value can move asynchronous to the buffers on
the cache, meaning it is possible to underflow, and potentially in really
pathelogical cases overflow.
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
When aa_get_buffer() pulls from the per-cpu list it unconditionally
decrements cache->hold. If hold reaches 0 while count is still non-zero,
the unsigned decrement wraps to UINT_MAX. This keeps hold non-zero for a
very long time, so aa_put_buffer() never returns buffers to the global
list, which can starve other CPUs and force repeated kmalloc(aa_g_path_max)
allocations.
Guard the decrement so hold never underflows.
Fixes: ea9bae12d028 ("apparmor: cache buffers on percpu list if there is lock contention")
Signed-off-by: Zhengmian Hu <huzhengmian@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
This patch doesn't change current functionality, it switches the two
uses of the in_ns fns and macros into the two semantically different
cases they are used for.
xxx_in_scope for checking mediation interaction between profiles
xxx_in_view to determine which profiles are visible.The scope will
always be a subset of the view as profiles that can not see each
other can not interact.
The split can not be completely done for label_match because it has to
distinct uses matching permission against label in scope, and checking
if a transition to a profile is allowed. The transition to a profile
can include profiles that are in view but not in scope, so retain this
distinction as a parameter.
While at the moment the two uses are very similar, in the future there
will be additional differences. So make sure the semantics differences
are present in the code.
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
compound match is inconsistent in returning a state or an integer error
this is problemati if the error is ever used as a state in the state
machine
Fixes: f1bd904175e81 ("apparmor: add the base fns() for domain labels")
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
The modes shouldn't be applied at the point of label match, it just
results in them being applied multiple times. Instead they should be
applied after which is already being done by all callers so it can
just be dropped from label_match.
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
The fast path cache check is incorrect forcing more slow path
revalidations than necessary, because the unix logic check is inverted.
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
Posix cpu timers requires an additional step beyond setting the rlimit.
Refactor the code so its clear when what code is setting the
limit and conditionally update the posix cpu timers when appropriate.
Fixes: baa73d9e478ff ("posix-timers: Make them configurable")
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
aa_cred_raw_label() and cred_label() now do the same things so
consolidate to cred_label()
Document the crit section use and constraints better and refactor
__begin_current_label_crit_section() into a base fn
__begin_cred_crit_section() and a wrapper that calls the base with
current cred.
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
The label and profile debug macros were not correctly pasting their
var args.
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
files with a dentry pointing aa_null.dentry where already rejected as
part of file_inheritance. Unfortunately the check in
common_file_perm() is insufficient to cover all cases causing
unnecessary audit messages without the original files context.
Eg.
[ 442.886474] audit: type=1400 audit(1704822661.616:329): apparmor="DENIED" operation="file_inherit" class="file" namespace="root//lxd-juju-98527a-0_<var-snap-lxd-common-lxd>" profile="snap.lxd.activate" name="/apparmor/.null" pid=9525 comm="snap-exec"
Further examples of this are in the logs of
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/apparmor/+bug/2120439
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/snapd/+bug/1952084
https://bugs.launchpad.net/snapd/+bug/2049099
These messages have no value and should not be sent to the logs.
AppArmor was already filtering the out in some cases but the original
patch did not catch all cases. Fix this by push the existing check
down into two functions that should cover all cases.
Link: https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/apparmor/+bug/2122743
Fixes: 192ca6b55a86 ("apparmor: revalidate files during exec")
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
aa_free_data() and free_attachment() don't guard against having
a NULL parameter passed to them. Fix this.
Reviewed-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
In policy_unpack.c:unpack_perms_table, the perms struct is allocated via
kcalloc, with the position being reset if the allocation fails. However,
the error path results in -EPROTO being retured instead of -ENOMEM. Fix
this to return the correct error code.
Reported-by: Zygmunt Krynicki <zygmunt.krynicki@canonical.com>
Fixes: fd1b2b95a2117 ("apparmor: add the ability for policy to specify a permission table")
Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>
Signed-off-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
If we are not in an atomic context in common_file_perm, then we don't have
to use the atomic versions, resulting in improved performance outside of
atomic contexts.
Signed-off-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
with the previous changes to mmap the in_atomic flag is now always
false, so drop it.
Suggested-by: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
The previous value of GFP_ATOMIC is an int and not a bool, potentially
resulting in UB when being assigned to a bool. In addition, the mmap hook
is called outside of locks (i.e. in a non-atomic context), so we can pass
a fixed constant value of false instead to common_mmap.
Signed-off-by: Ryan Lee <ryan.lee@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
This new field allows reliable identification of the binary that
triggered a denial since the existing field (comm) only gives the name of
the binary, not its path. Thus comm doesn't work for binaries outside of
$PATH or works unreliably when two binaries have the same name.
Additionally comm can be modified by a program, for example, comm="(tor)"
or comm=4143504920506F6C6C6572 (= ACPI Poller).
Signed-off-by: Maxime Bélair <maxime.belair@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
Add support for the per permission tag index for a given permission
set. This will be used by both meta-data tagging, to allow annotating
accept states with context and debug information. As well as by rule
tainting and triggers to specify the taint or trigger to be applied.
Since these are low frequency ancillary data items they are stored
in a tighter packed format to that allows for sharing and reuse of the
strings between permissions and accept states. Reducing the amount of
kernel memory use at the cost of having to go through a couple if
index based indirections.
The tags are just strings that has no meaning with out context. When
used as meta-data for auditing and debugging its entirely information
for userspace, but triggers, and tainting can be used to affect the
domain. However they all exist in the same packed data set and can
be shared between different uses.
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
The strtable is currently limited to a single entry string on unpack
even though domain has the concept of multiple entries within it. Make
this a reality as it will be used for tags and more advanced domain
transitions.
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
Source blob may come from userspace and might be unaligned.
Try to optize the copying process by avoiding unaligned memory accesses.
- Added Fixes tag
- Added "Fix &" to description as this doesn't just optimize but fixes
a potential unaligned memory access
Fixes: e6e8bf418850d ("apparmor: fix restricted endian type warnings for dfa unpack")
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
[jj: remove duplicate word "convert" in comment trigger checkpatch warning]
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
The dfa tables can originate from kernel or userspace and 8-byte alignment
isn't always guaranteed and as such may trigger unaligned memory accesses
on various architectures. Resulting in the following
[ 73.901376] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 341 at security/apparmor/match.c:316 aa_dfa_unpack+0x6cc/0x720
[ 74.015867] Modules linked in: binfmt_misc evdev flash sg drm drm_panel_orientation_quirks backlight i2c_core configfs nfnetlink autofs4 ext4 crc16 mbcache jbd2 hid_generic usbhid sr_mod hid cdrom
sd_mod ata_generic ohci_pci ehci_pci ehci_hcd ohci_hcd pata_ali libata sym53c8xx scsi_transport_spi tg3 scsi_mod usbcore libphy scsi_common mdio_bus usb_common
[ 74.428977] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 341 Comm: apparmor_parser Not tainted 6.18.0-rc6+ #9 NONE
[ 74.536543] Call Trace:
[ 74.568561] [<0000000000434c24>] dump_stack+0x8/0x18
[ 74.633757] [<0000000000476438>] __warn+0xd8/0x100
[ 74.696664] [<00000000004296d4>] warn_slowpath_fmt+0x34/0x74
[ 74.771006] [<00000000008db28c>] aa_dfa_unpack+0x6cc/0x720
[ 74.843062] [<00000000008e643c>] unpack_pdb+0xbc/0x7e0
[ 74.910545] [<00000000008e7740>] unpack_profile+0xbe0/0x1300
[ 74.984888] [<00000000008e82e0>] aa_unpack+0xe0/0x6a0
[ 75.051226] [<00000000008e3ec4>] aa_replace_profiles+0x64/0x1160
[ 75.130144] [<00000000008d4d90>] policy_update+0xf0/0x280
[ 75.201057] [<00000000008d4fc8>] profile_replace+0xa8/0x100
[ 75.274258] [<0000000000766bd0>] vfs_write+0x90/0x420
[ 75.340594] [<00000000007670cc>] ksys_write+0x4c/0xe0
[ 75.406932] [<0000000000767174>] sys_write+0x14/0x40
[ 75.472126] [<0000000000406174>] linux_sparc_syscall+0x34/0x44
[ 75.548802] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[ 75.609503] dfa blob stream 0xfff0000008926b96 not aligned.
[ 75.682695] Kernel unaligned access at TPC[8db2a8] aa_dfa_unpack+0x6e8/0x720
Work around it by using the get_unaligned_xx() helpers.
Fixes: e6e8bf418850d ("apparmor: fix restricted endian type warnings for dfa unpack")
Reported-by: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de>
Closes: https://github.com/sparclinux/issues/issues/30
Signed-off-by: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
strcpy() is deprecated; use memcpy() instead. Unlike strcpy(), memcpy()
does not copy the NUL terminator from the source string, which would be
overwritten anyway on every iteration when using strcpy(). snprintf()
then ensures that 'char *s' is NUL-terminated.
Replace the hard-coded path length to remove the magic number 6, and add
a comment explaining the extra 11 bytes.
Closes: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/88
Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
Deal with the potential that sock and sock-sk can be NULL during
socket setup or teardown. This could lead to an oops. The fix for NULL
pointer dereference in __unix_needs_revalidation shows this is at
least possible for af_unix sockets. While the fix for af_unix sockets
applies for newer mediation this is still the fall back path for older
af_unix mediation and other sockets, so ensure it is covered.
Fixes: 56974a6fcfef6 ("apparmor: add base infastructure for socket mediation")
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
When receiving file descriptors via SCM_RIGHTS, both the socket pointer
and the socket's sk pointer can be NULL during socket setup or teardown,
causing NULL pointer dereferences in __unix_needs_revalidation().
This is a regression in AppArmor 5.0.0 (kernel 6.17+) where the new
__unix_needs_revalidation() function was added without proper NULL checks.
The crash manifests as:
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0x0000000000000018
RIP: aa_file_perm+0xb7/0x3b0 (or +0xbe/0x3b0, +0xc0/0x3e0)
Call Trace:
apparmor_file_receive+0x42/0x80
security_file_receive+0x2e/0x50
receive_fd+0x1d/0xf0
scm_detach_fds+0xad/0x1c0
The function dereferences sock->sk->sk_family without checking if either
sock or sock->sk is NULL first.
Add NULL checks for both sock and sock->sk before accessing sk_family.
Fixes: 88fec3526e841 ("apparmor: make sure unix socket labeling is correctly updated.")
Reported-by: Jamin Mc <jaminmc@gmail.com>
Closes: https://bugzilla.proxmox.com/show_bug.cgi?id=7083
Closes: https://gitlab.com/apparmor/apparmor/-/issues/568
Signed-off-by: Fabian Grünbichler <f.gruenbichler@proxmox.com>
Signed-off-by: System Administrator <root@localhost>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
|
strcpy() is deprecated; replace it with a direct '/' assignment. The
buffer is already NUL-terminated, so there is no need to copy an
additional NUL terminator as strcpy() did.
Update the comment and add the local variable 'is_root' for clarity.
Closes: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/88
Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum <thorsten.blum@linux.dev>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
