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authorSean Anderson <sean.anderson@seco.com>2022-09-07 13:44:55 +0800
committerPeng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>2022-09-07 13:44:55 +0800
commit857e313a3d44618e09fc64816fd5e561e2189ab7 (patch)
treef8f0b75ad34cd7dc2e3f4f69b3c0bb392fbb2b25 /arch/arm/mach-stm32mp/cmd_stm32prog/stm32prog.h
parentf1061c570112670be3259fff7966caad96c6e2cf (diff)
net: fm: Add support for FIT firmware
Fman microcode is executable code (AFAICT) loaded into a coprocessor. As such, if verified boot is enabled, it must be verified like other executable code. However, this is not currently done. This commit adds verified boot functionality by encapsulating the microcode in a FIT, which can then be signed/verified as normal. By default we allow fallback to unencapsulated firmware, but if CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE is enabled, then we make it mandatory. Because existing Layerscape do not use this config (instead enabling CONFIG_CHAIN_OF_TRUST), this should not break any existing boards. An example (mildly-abbreviated) its is provided below: / { #address-cells = <1>; images { firmware { data = /incbin/(/path/to/firmware); type = "firmware"; arch = "arm64"; compression = "none"; signature { algo = "sha256,rsa2048"; key-name-hint = "your key name"; }; }; }; configurations { default = "conf"; conf { description = "Load FMAN microcode"; fman = "firmware"; }; }; }; Reviewed-by: Simon Glass <sjg@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Sean Anderson <sean.anderson@seco.com> Signed-off-by: Peng Fan <peng.fan@nxp.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm/mach-stm32mp/cmd_stm32prog/stm32prog.h')
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