summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorNikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>2025-08-19 16:48:33 -0700
committerSean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>2025-08-21 08:51:39 -0700
commita311fce2b694599cede76c5d7a0905336bc09803 (patch)
tree298dcc20a56061777fc8e2225a10a39c2dc925f1
parentf7b1f0c1620db689e085569035a659340a3209c3 (diff)
KVM: SVM: Enable Secure TSC for SNP guests
Add support for Secure TSC, allowing userspace to configure the Secure TSC feature for SNP guests. Use the SNP specification's desired TSC frequency parameter during the SNP_LAUNCH_START command to set the mean TSC frequency in KHz for Secure TSC enabled guests. Always use kvm->arch.arch.default_tsc_khz as the TSC frequency that is passed to SNP guests in the SNP_LAUNCH_START command. The default value is the host TSC frequency. The userspace can optionally change the TSC frequency via the KVM_SET_TSC_KHZ ioctl before calling the SNP_LAUNCH_START ioctl. Introduce the read-only MSR GUEST_TSC_FREQ (0xc0010134) that returns guest's effective frequency in MHZ when Secure TSC is enabled for SNP guests. Disable interception of this MSR when Secure TSC is enabled. Note that GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR is accessible only to the guest and not from the hypervisor context. Co-developed-by: Ketan Chaturvedi <Ketan.Chaturvedi@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Ketan Chaturvedi <Ketan.Chaturvedi@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com> [sean: contain Secure TSC to sev.c] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250819234833.3080255-9-seanjc@google.com [sean: return -EINVAL if TSC frequency is '0'] Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c28
2 files changed, 29 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
index ffc27f676243..17f6c3fedeee 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h
@@ -299,6 +299,7 @@ static_assert((X2AVIC_MAX_PHYSICAL_ID & AVIC_PHYSICAL_MAX_INDEX_MASK) == X2AVIC_
#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_RESTRICTED_INJECTION BIT(3)
#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_ALTERNATE_INJECTION BIT(4)
#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP BIT(5)
+#define SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC BIT(9)
#define VMCB_ALLOWED_SEV_FEATURES_VALID BIT_ULL(63)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 7d1d34e45310..86fd270a1d6e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -146,6 +146,14 @@ static bool sev_vcpu_has_debug_swap(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
return sev->vmsa_features & SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP;
}
+static bool snp_is_secure_tsc_enabled(struct kvm *kvm)
+{
+ struct kvm_sev_info *sev = to_kvm_sev_info(kvm);
+
+ return (sev->vmsa_features & SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC) &&
+ !WARN_ON_ONCE(!sev_snp_guest(kvm));
+}
+
/* Must be called with the sev_bitmap_lock held */
static bool __sev_recycle_asids(unsigned int min_asid, unsigned int max_asid)
{
@@ -415,6 +423,9 @@ static int __sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp,
if (data->flags)
return -EINVAL;
+ if (!snp_active)
+ valid_vmsa_features &= ~SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC;
+
if (data->vmsa_features & ~valid_vmsa_features)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -2187,6 +2198,13 @@ static int snp_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
if (!(params.policy & SNP_POLICY_MASK_RSVD_MBO))
return -EINVAL;
+ if (snp_is_secure_tsc_enabled(kvm)) {
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!kvm->arch.default_tsc_khz))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ start.desired_tsc_khz = kvm->arch.default_tsc_khz;
+ }
+
sev->policy = params.policy;
sev->snp_context = snp_context_create(kvm, argp);
@@ -2195,6 +2213,7 @@ static int snp_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
start.gctx_paddr = __psp_pa(sev->snp_context);
start.policy = params.policy;
+
memcpy(start.gosvw, params.gosvw, sizeof(params.gosvw));
rc = __sev_issue_cmd(argp->sev_fd, SEV_CMD_SNP_LAUNCH_START, &start, &argp->error);
if (rc) {
@@ -3085,6 +3104,9 @@ out:
sev_supported_vmsa_features = 0;
if (sev_es_debug_swap_enabled)
sev_supported_vmsa_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_DEBUG_SWAP;
+
+ if (sev_snp_enabled && tsc_khz && cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SNP_SECURE_TSC))
+ sev_supported_vmsa_features |= SVM_SEV_FEAT_SECURE_TSC;
}
void sev_hardware_unsetup(void)
@@ -4452,6 +4474,9 @@ void sev_es_recalc_msr_intercepts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP) &&
!guest_cpu_cap_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDPID));
+ svm_set_intercept_for_msr(vcpu, MSR_AMD64_GUEST_TSC_FREQ, MSR_TYPE_R,
+ !snp_is_secure_tsc_enabled(vcpu->kvm));
+
/*
* For SEV-ES, accesses to MSR_IA32_XSS should not be intercepted if
* the host/guest supports its use.
@@ -4591,6 +4616,9 @@ int sev_vcpu_create(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return -ENOMEM;
svm->sev_es.vmsa = page_address(vmsa_page);
+
+ vcpu->arch.guest_tsc_protected = snp_is_secure_tsc_enabled(vcpu->kvm);
+
return 0;
}